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INTRODUCTION

We all know that the use of modern technology is transforming the practice
of law. Indeed, when ABA President Carolyn Lamm created the Ethics 20/20
Commission in 2009, she said:
Technological advances and globalization have changed our
profession in ways not yet reflected in our ethics codes and regulatory
structure. Technologies such as e-mail, the Internet and smart phones
are transforming the way we practice law and our relationships with
clients, just as they have compressed our world and expanded
international business opportunities for our clients.
One of the most important ways in which technology is affecting the practice of
law is in the area of electronic discovery.2 E-discovery poses a wide range of
issues, but one that is of paramount importance to lawyers is the need to
maintain attorney-client privilege (ACP) and work-product protection (WPP)
when producing information in response to discovery requests.
Issues surrounding the inadvertent production of privileged information in
discovery (IPPI) have existed for quite some time.4 However, the development
of modern technological devices and applications, which have produced a vast
amount of electronically stored information (ESI), has increased the importance

1. Press Release. Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Comm'n
to Address Tech. & Global Practice Challenges Facing U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4, 2009),
http://apps.american bar.org/abaniet/media/release/news release.cfm?releaseid=730.
2.
See Damian Vargas, Note, Electronic Discovery: 2006 Amnendinents to the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 396, 397 (2008) (citing THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE, TiHE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES & COIMENTARY FOR
MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE, at vi (Ragan et al. eds., 2005),

available at https://thesedonaconference.org/publication/Managing o20lnfornation%20 o2526%20
Records (access required)) (discussing how technological advances such as digital information
storage have changed traditional discovery practices).
3.
This Article is limited to inadvertent disclosure of privileged information in discovery in
federal court. where Federal Rule of Evidence 502 applies. See FED. R. EVID. 502. Different issues
arise in state court where Rule 502 is not applicable, absent a federal court order that would be
binding on state courts, or in transactional matters. FED. R. EVID. 502(d); see Paula Schaefer, he
Future of Jnadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69
MD. L. REV. 195, 196 (2010). However, the central thesis of this Article-recommending that
lawyers prepare carefully drafted clawback agreements-could be applied to both litigation outside
of the federal courts and to transactional matters.
4.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility. Formal Op. 92-368 (1992) (advising
that when a lawyer receives materials that appear on their face to be privileged or otherwise
confidential and that were clearly not intended for the lawyer, the lawyer should not examine the
materials, should notity the sender, and should comply with the sender's instructions regarding the
materials). In 2002, the ABA adopted Model Rule 4.4(b), wvhich reduces the obligations on the
receiving lawy er. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012) (requiring that the
receiving lawyer "shall promptly notify the sender" upon receipt of privileged or confidential
information).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/5

2

Crystal: Inadvertent Production of Priviledged Information in Discovery in
2013]

THE NEED FOR WELL-DRAFTED CLAWBACK AGREEMENTS

583

of the issue.5 In the last few years, important changes in ethical, evidentiary, and
procedural rules have gone into effect, changing the way lawyers must deal with
issues arising from IPPl.6 However, the scope, application, and interaction of
these rule changes can be complex and confusing. This Article focuses on
practical problems that lawyers face in protecting against IPPI in federal court
and in dealing with such disclosures once they occur.
This Article is divided into five parts: Part II discusses ACP and WPPwhich this Article refers to collectively as privileges-in both federal and state
court. Part III is an overview of Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 502, which
deals with when IPPI amounts to a waiver of privileges,7 and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 26(b)(5)(B), which deals with the rights and obligations
of a parties who make or receive an IPPI.8 Part IV focuses on lawyers' ethical
obligations.
Part IV.A outlines the various ethical obligations generally
applicable to lawyers when dealing with IPPI. Part IV.B discusses the major
ethical issues that lawyers face in dealing with IPPI and argues that a welldrafted clawback order is a major tool for dealing with these issues.
Unfortunately, there are a number of legal and practical questions surrounding
clawback orders. 9 Part V analyzes the legal issues clouding the use of clawback
orders. Part V.A discusses court decisions that have adopted a narrow view of
court authority to issue clawback orders under Rule 502(b). Part V.B examines
the specific issues arising from the case law. Part V.C considers cases where
clawback agreements have failed to achieve their purpose. Part VI discusses
how lawyers can draft clawback agreements and orders to comply with
governing case law. Appendices to the Article provide examples of clawback
orders
and
agreements
for
lawyers
and j udges
to
consider.

5. See Schaefer, supra note 3, at 195.
6. See, e.g., id. at 205 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009)
(amended 2012)) (ethical rule requiring lawyer who receives IPPI to promptly notify the sender);
Ann M. Murphy, FederalRule of Evidence 502: The "Get Out of Jail Free" Provision-orIs It?
41 N.M. L. REV. 193. 200-03 (2011) (discussing the history of Federal Rule of Evidence 502);
Vargas, supra note 2, at 396 & ii. 1 (identifying the 2006 amendment to the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 as one of the "E-discovery Amendments").
7. See FED. R. EVID. 502.
8.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
9. See D. Patricia Wallace. What Everj Attorney -Needs to Know About Electronic
Technology, 82 FLA. B.J. 23, 30 (2008) ("Claw back agreements sound like a good idea, but like so
many good ideas, such agreements pose problems.").
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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURT

Federal law recognizes both ACP and WPP.1 Federal Rule of Evidence
501 states that "[t]he common law-as interpreted by United States courts in the
light of reason and experience-governs a claim of privilege." 12 The rule
contains an exception for cases in which state law determines the existence of the
privilege: "But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or
defense for which state law applies the rule of decision." 1 In cases involving
both federal and state claims, federal courts have generally held that federal law
controls the existence of any privilege, although the Supreme Court has not
decided the question.14
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) provides for WPP:
(3) Trial Preparation-Materials.
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not
discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative
(including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be
discovered if:
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to
prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their
substantial equivalent by other means.'1
State law, either by court decision or by rule, generally recognizes both ACP
and WPP, although the scope of these doctrines in state court may vary
significantly from the federal rules. 16 For example, federal law is likely to be

10. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)
(explaining the purpose of ACP and the important role it plays in the administration of justice).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) ("Not
even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the
mental impressions of an attorney.").
12. FED. R. EVID. 501.
13. Id.
14. See Alpert v. Riley, 267 F.R.D. 202, 207-08 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Ferko v. Nat'1
Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, 218 F.R.D. 125, 133 (E.D. Tex. 2003); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
16. Compare Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981) (adopting a case-bycase approach to privilege, and concluding "that the narrow 'control group test' sanctioned by the
Court of Appeals" was inconsistent with the FRE), with Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 257 (111.1982) ("The control-group test appears to us to strike a reasonable
balance ... ").
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more protective of ACP for corporations than state law. Some states limit the
corporate ACP to communications between lawyers for the corporation and
members of the control group.' 8 Under the principles applied in Upjohn Co. v.
United States,19 the ACP in federal court applies to communications between
lawyers and any employee of the corporation if the purpose of the
communication is to facilitate the giving of legal advice by the lawyer to the
corporation. This includes the gathering of factual information by the lawyers
from the employees.21

III.

AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502 AND FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(b)(5)(B)

A.

Scope of FederalRule of Evidence 502

Under federal and state law, both ACP and WPP can be waived.
When
disclosure of information subject to ACP or WPP is "made in a federal
proceeding or to a federal office or agency," FRE 502 determines whether ACP
23
or WPP has been waived . Rule 502 applies to proceedings in federal court and
to federal court-annexed and mandated arbitration. 2 However, Rule 502 extends
beyond federal proceedings. Under section (f), the rule applies in state court
proceedings "in the circumstances set out in the rule," and this is true "even if
state law provides the rule of decision."2 Under section (d), if a federal court
orders that a disclosure connected with litigation before the court is not a waiver,

17. See Timothy P. Glynn, FederalizingPrivilege, 52 Amyl.
U. L. REV. 59, 105-06 (discussing
the difference between federal and state ACP protections).
18. See, e.g.. Consolidation Coal, 432 N.E.2d at 257 ("The control-group test appears to us to
strike a reasonable balance ...
).
19. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
20. Id. at 394-95.
21. Id. at 394. In LC)john, the lawyers sent a question to lower-level employees to obtain
information regarding questionable payments to foreign officials. Id.
22. See FED. R. EVID. 502; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 78 (2000) (waiver of ACP); id. § 91 (waiver of WPP by voluntary act); id. § 92 (waiver
of WPP by use in litigation). However, the standards for waiver of WPP are different from those
for ACP. See -on. Paul W. Grimm et al., FederalRule of Evidence 502: Has It Lived L)> to Its
Potential?. 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 3, 2011. at 1. 14 (noting that waiver of ACP and WPP "result
from different circumstances"). Disclosure of information to any third party may amount to a
waiver of ACP, but it will only operate as a waiver of WPP if the disclosure is inconsistent with
preserving the secreev of the information from an adversary. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 91(4).
23. FED. R. EVID. 502(a). The rule does not apply to other privileges but courts could extend
the rule by analogy to deal with waivers of other privileges. See, e.g., Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v.
United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 571. 583 (2012) (citing FED. R. EvID. 502(b)) (applies FRE 502(b) to
waiver of the "deliberative process privilege").
24. FED.R.EVID. 502(t).

25. Id.
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then the order applies "in any other federal or state proceeding." 26 Thus, there
are at least two significant circumstances in which Rule 502 will override state
law. First, in federal proceedings where state law controls-principally diversity
cases-Rule 502, not state law, will determine if a waiver of ACP or WNPP has
27
occurred. Second. if a federal court finds that a disclosure did not operate as a
waiver, that decision will be binding on all state courts even in cases where state
law applies.28 In addition, if a
disclosure is made in a state proceeding and is not the subject of a statecourt order ... the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal
proceeding if . .. it would not be a waiver under [Rule 502] or is not a
waiver tinder the law of the state where the disclosure occurred29
Rule 502 only applies with regard to the issue of waiver, not with regard to
scope of ACP or WPP.30 The Statement of Congressional Intent regarding Rule
502 states: "The rule does not alter the substantive law regarding attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection in any other respect, including the burden
on the party invoking the privilege (or protection) to prove that the particular
information (or communication) qualifies for it." Thus, a court must determine
whether ACP or WPP applies to certain materials based on applicable state or
federal law.
If ACP or WPP does not apply, then Rule 502 provides no
protection to the party who is resisting production of or seeking to reacquire the
material as to which there is a claim of ACP or Wpp.f
In order for Rule 502 to apply, the disclosure must be made "in a federal
proceeding or to a federal office or agency."
If the disclosure is not in
connection with such a proceeding, then the Rule does not apply and common
law principles will determine whether a waiver has occurred.' 5 For example,

26. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
27. See FED. R. EVID. 502(f).
28. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
29. FED. R. EVID. 502(c).
30. 154 CoNG. REc. 18016 (2008) (Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
31. Id.
32. See Preferred Care Partners Holding Corp. v. Humana, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 684, 689 (S.D.
Fla. 2009) ("In a diversity action ... state law governs the scope of the attorney client privilege.");
see, e.g., Amobi v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 51-52 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that a
memorandum prepared by attorney was not subject to ACP because, in the D.C. Circuit, ACP only
covers communications that include confidential information received by the attorney from the
client, not third parties: however, memorandum was subject to WPP because it contained attorney
mental impressions and was prepared in anticipation of litigation).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note ("The rule governs only certain waivers
by disclosure.").
34. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
35. Grimn et al., supra note 22, at 19 20 (citing FED. R. EVID. 502 & advisory committee's
note).
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Alpert v. Riley36 involved litigation over whether the defendant, Riley,
improperly used his position as trustee of trusts created by Alpert. At issue in
the case was whether Riley had waived ACP and WPP with regard to various
"legal" documents he placed on his partner's computer.
The court held that
Rule 502 did not apply because Riley placed the files on the computer before the
start of any litigation with Alpert and he did not produce the files in connection
with any other litigation.39 If he had disclosed the materials in connection with
state proceedings and there was no state order with regard to the disclosure, then
Rule 502-in particular Rule 502(c)-would have applied. 0 Similarly, if the
materials are being used outside of the evidentiary context, Rule 502 does not
apply."
Rule 502 only applies when the claim of waiver is based on disclosure of
material.42 A party may waive ACP or WPP by placing the advice of counsel in
issue, but that form of waiver is not governed by Rule 502.43
B.

Purposes and ProvisionsofFederalRule of Evidence 502

Prior to the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 in 2006,44 uncertainty
with regard to waiver of ACP and WPP existed on two major issues. First, under
what circumstances did disclosure of privileged material amount to a waiver of
privileges? Prior to the adoption of Rule 502, three approaches could be found
in the case law.
Under the strict approach, any disclosure to a third person
amounted to a waiver because privileged information had been released to a
party outside the attorney-client relationship.46 Other courts took the opposite

36. 267 F.R.D. 202 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
37. Id at 205.
38. Id.
39. Id at 210.
40. See FED. R. EvID. 502(c).
41. 154 CONG. REC. 18016 (2008) (Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence) ("[I]t is not intended to alter the rules and practices governing use of
information outside this evidentiary context.").
42. See FED. R. EVID. 502 ("The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to
disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or workproduction protection." (emphasis added)).
43. See Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 458. 469 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citing United
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991); Chevron Corp. v. Penzoil Co., 974 F.2d
1156, 1162 63 (9th Cir. 1992)).
44. For a detailed discussion of Rule 502 and a criticism of some decisions that are
inconsistent with the purposes of the section, see Grimm et al., supra note 22, at 8.
45. Ken M. Zeidner, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege:
Looking to the Wlork-Product Doctrine fbr Guidance, 22 CARDOzO L. REv. 1315, 1318 (2001)
("Federal courts have developed three divergent approaches to inadvertent disclosure of privileged
documents during discovery.").
46. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee's note ("[A] few courts hold that any
inadvertent disclosure of a communication or information protected under the attorney-client
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view, holding that disclosure amounted to a waiver only if the party intended to
disclose privileged information.)4
Most courts, however, adopted a middle
ground in which the determination of whether a. waiver occurred depended on
the precautions taken. 8 Rule 502(b) adopts the majority view.49
Second, when does a waiver of a privilege apply beyond the particular
document in question to cover other documents that are part of the same subject
matter?50 Rule 502(a) resolves this question by limiting subject matter waiver to
situations where the waiver was intentional and other requirements are met. 1
The Advisory Committee's Notes to the Rule state that the purpose of the rule
was to resolve these issues and also to reduce the costs necessary to protect
against waivers of the privilege:
This new rule has two major purposes:
(1) It resolves some longstanding disputes in the courts about the
effect of certain disclosures of communications or information protected
by the attorney-client privilege or as work product-specifically those
disputes involving inadvertent disclosure and subject matter waiver.
(2) It responds to the widespread complaint that litigation costs
necessary to protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege or work
product have become prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure
(however innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver
of all protected communications or information.
Rule 502 is divided into seven subsections.54 Subsection (a) deals with the
issue of subject matter waiver-i.e., when a waiver of the ACP or WPP as to a
disclosed communication applies to other undisclosed communications. 5 The
section provides for subject matter waiver only when the waiver of the disclosed

privilege or as work product constitutes a waiver without regard to the protections taken to avoid
such a disclosure.") (citing Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228. 235 (D. Md. 2005)).
47. Id. ("A few courts find that a disclosure must be intentional to be a waiver.").
48. Id. ("Most courts find a waiver only if the disclosing party acted carelessly in disclosing
the communication or information and failed to request its return in a timely manner.").
49. Murphy, supra note 6, at 207 (citing FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee's note)
(noting that Congress adopted the "middle ground" approach).
50. Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of 4aiver of Privilege in the
Federal Courts: A Proposalfor a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REv. 211, 224 (2006)
("Under existing federal case law, a decision that an inadvertent disclosure results in waiver with
respect to the disclosed document may also waive the privilege with regard to all communications
dealing with the same subject matter. Similar to determining the effect of an inadvertent disclosure,
courts ha-ve used various approaches to the issue of subject matter waiver.").
51. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee's note ("[S]ubject matter waiver is limited to
situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective,
misleading and unfair manner.").
52. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note.
53. Id.
54. See FED. R. EVID. 5 02(a)4g).
55. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
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communication was "intentional" and other requirements are met, including
when the communications "ought in fairness to be considered together." 56 The
Advisory Committee's Note indicates that the fairness requirement exists "in
order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the
disadvantage of the adversary."57
Rule 502(b) deals with situations of "inadvertent" rather than intentional
disclosure. Under this rule, if a disclosure is "made in a federal proceeding or
to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver" of ACP
or WPP if the disclosure was "inadvertent" and two other requirements are met:
the privilege-holder took reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure and acted
promptly to rectify the error once it was discovered. 59 As discussed below,
courts are divided on the meaning of an "inadvertent" disclosure.60
Rule 502(c) answers the question of when disclosure in a state proceeding
amounts to a waiver of privilege in a federal proceedin.
The rule is based on
the principle of maximum protection of the privileges.6 Therefore, a disclosure
in a state proceeding does not operate as a waiver in a federal proceeding if the
disclosure would not be a waiver under either Rule 502 or the law of the state
where the disclosure occurred.
As discussed more fully below, Rule 502(d) provides an important avenue
for protection of privileges from waiver by disclosure.64 A court may order that
disclosure of a communication does not operate as a waiver.65 The order applies
not only to the case pending before the court, but it also has a broader effect:
"[T]he disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding."66
Rule 502(e) deals with the effect of a party agreement with regard to the
consequences of a disclosure of privileged material in a federal proceeding.67
The agreement is binding on the parties but has no further effect "unless it is
incorporated into a court order."68

56. FED. R. EVID. 502(a)(1}-(3).
57. FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory committee's note.
58. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
59. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(1}-(3).
60. See infra Part IV.B.
61. FED. R. EVID. 502(c).
62. See FED. R. EVID. 502(c) advisory committee's note ("The Committee determined that
the proper solution for the federal court is to apply the law that is most protective of privilege and
work product.").

63. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Warren, No. 2: 10 CV 13128, 2012 WL 1454008 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 26, 2012) (citing FED. R. EVID. 502) (holding that under FRE 502(c), the Michigan rule
with regard to waiver of privilege rather than FRE 502(b) applied because waiver occurred in
connection with a state proceeding).
64. See infa Part V.A.
65. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
66. Id.

67. FED. R. EVID. 502(e).
68. Id.
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Rule 502(f) states that the rule applies in both state and federal proceedings
to the extent set forth in the rule.
In addition, it applies to federal courtannexed and federal court-mandated proceedings.0 The rule is clear that it
"applies even if state law provides the rule of decision."i
Thus, Rule 502
applies in federal cases in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship. Subsection (g) contains definitions.
C.

FederalRule of Civil Procedure26(b) (5) (B)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) provides a method for a party
who has produced information that is subject to a claim of either ACP or WPP to
prevent use or dissemination of the material pending a resolution of the claim.74
Under the rule, a producing party may notify the receiving party of its claim of
ACP or WPP and the basis of the claim.7 5 On receipt of the notice, the receiving
"party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and
any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until the claim is
resolved; [and] must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party
disclosed it before being notified."6 The receiving party has the option of filing
a motion under seal seeking a determination of whether ACP or WPP applies to
the material, or the receiving party can await action by the producing party.77 If
the information has been returned to the producing party, that party must
preserve the material pending a judicial determination of the claim of privilege.
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) ties in with Rule 502 because one of the requirements to avoid
a waiver of ACP or WPP under Rule 502(b) is that the producing party
"promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable)
following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B)." 79

69.

FED. R. EVID. 502(f).

70. Id
71.
72.

Id
See FED. R. EVID. 502(f) advisory committee's note ("[T]he rule applies to state law

causes of action brought in federal court.").

73. FED. R. EVID. 502(g).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id

78.
79.

d
FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
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EITICAL OBLIGATIONS AND ISSUES FACING LAWYERS DEALING WITH
INADVERTENT PRODUCTION OF PRIVILEGED INFORMATION (IPPI)

A.

Ethics Rules Applicable to IPPI

A number of ethics rules are involved in the topic of IPPI.80 With regard to
producing parties, Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(ABA Model Rules) imposes on lawyers a duty of competency.
Rule 1.6
incorporates the duty of competency of Rule 1.1 regarding communications
82
where a claim of privilege is or may be made. Amendments to the comments
to Rule 1.1 adopted by the ABA in 2012 state that the duty of competency
requires lawyers to keep abreast of technological developments.- Comment 8 to
Rule 1.1 states: "To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should
keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and
risks associated with relevant technology .... 84
With regard to confidentiality of client information, Comment 18 to Rule 1.6
now states:
The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of, information relating to the representation of a client does
not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made
reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure. Factors to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's efforts
include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the
likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the
cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing
the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect
the lawyer's ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or
important piece of software excessively difficult to use). A client may
require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required
by this Rule or may give informed consent to forgo security measures

80. See generally John M. Barkett, More on the Ethics of E-Discovery: Predictive Coding
and Other Forms of Computer-Assisted Review (2012) (unpublished paper), available at http://
law.duke.edu/sites/defaultfiles/centersijudicialstudies/TAR conference/Panel 5-Original Paper.pdf
(generally discussing the ethical and legal obligations facing counsel regarding e-discovery issues).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012). This Article uses the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct as the basis for lawyers' ethical obligations. Most states' courts have
adopted rules of conduct based on the ABA Model Rules although almost all have adopted
variations fi-om the ABA Rules. Quintin Johnstone, An Overview of the Legal Profession in the
Lnited States, How that Profession Recently Has Been Changing, and Its Future Prospects, 26
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 752 (2008). Federal courts generally adopt the conduct rules of the state
in wlhich they sit. Id.
82. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 cnt. 18 (2012).
83. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 8.

84. Id.
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that would otherwise be required by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may
be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client's information in
order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that
govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the
loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the
scope of these Rules. For a lawyer's duties when sharing information
with nonlaw'ers outside the lawyer's own firm, see Rule 5.3, Comments
[3]-[41.

Both producing and receiving lawyers have a broad duty of communication to
their clients under Model Rule 1.4 with regard to significant aspects of the
relationship.8 As for nonlawyer providers of services, such as e-discovery
vendors. Rule 5.3 imposes a duty on lawyers of reasonable supervision of their
conduct.8
Rule 4.4(b) deals specifically with the obligations of recipients of privileged
material.8 Under the rule, if a lawyer "receives a document or electronically
stored information relating to the representation of a lawyer's client," and the
lawyxer either "knows or reasonably should know" that the material was
inadvertently sent, then the lawyer should promptly notify the sender. 89 The
purpose of the rule is to allow the sender an opportunity to take protective
measures, such as seeking a court order re uiring return of the material under
FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) or equivalent state rules.9 Whether the lawyer is required to
do anything more, such as return the document, is a legal rather than an ethical
matter.9 If the law does not require return of a document, the decision whether
or not to do so is a matter of professional judgment "ordinarily reserved to the
lawyer." 92
B.

Ethical Issues FacingLawyers Dealingwith IPPI

Lawyers handling discovery in federal court face a number of ethical
problems regarding the risk of disclosure of privileged information.93 Under
Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, lawyers are required to meet
and confer on various aspects of the litigation at least twenty-one days before a
scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b). 94 The rule requires the parties to

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 18.
See id. R. 1.4.
See id. R. 5.3.
See id. R. 4.4(b).

89. Id.
90. Id. R. 4.4(b) cmt. 2.
91. Id R. 4.4(b) cmt. 3.
92. Id
93. See Barkett, supra note 80, at 32.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(t)(1).
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"develop a proposed discovery plan." 95 Rule 26(f)(3)(D) requires that the
discovery plan state: "[A]ny issues about claims of privilege or of protection as
trial-preparation materials, including-if the parties agree on a procedure to
assert these claims after production-whether to ask the court to include their
agreement in an order." 9 To engage in negotiations with opposing counsel to
develop a discovery plan, lawyers need to be competent about ways in which
discovery, particularly e-discovery, can be conducted, including ways in which
privileged material can be separated from responsive material and an appropriate
privilege log can be developed. 98
There are a wide variety of ways in which discovery plans can be developed,
with different degrees of cost and risk of production of privileged material. 99
Therefore, attorneys must communicate100 with their clients about the benefits,
costs, and risks associated with these options so that clients can make informed
decisions about the authority that they will give their lawyers with regard to
discovery plans.l0 Communication with clients must obviously occur before
lawyxers meet and confer but will likely continue throughout the case as
discovery issues develop.' 0
In connection with their duty to communicate,
lawyers should inform clients of the following principles: First, federal judges

95. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D).
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012).
98. See Barkett, supra note 80, at 32 33.
99. See, e.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (D.N.J. 2002)
(regarding the development of a discovery plan in today's electronic society. the discovery plan
"should include a discussion on whether each side possesses information in electronic form,
whether they intend to produce such material, whether each other's software is compatible, whether
there exists any privilege issue requiring redaction, and how to allocate costs involved with each of
the foregoing").
100. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF' CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2012) (requiring communication
between lawyer and client).
101. For an example of the problems that can result wvhen lawyers fail to pay appropriate
attention and to counsel their clients about the costs involved in document review, see In re Fannie
Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In that case, the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)-a nonparty to the litigation-stipulated to produce documents in
accordance with search terms determined by the requesting party and to waive any claim for costshifting under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Id. at 821 22. As a result, OFHEO had to hire
fifty contract attorneys to review documents at a cost of $6 million, which was more than 9% of its

annual budget. Id. at 817. Also, see 1-led Pharma Inc. v. Bionatrix,Inc., No. 03 3677 (DRD),
2011 WL 6140658 (DN.J. Dec. 9, 2011), where the plaintiff had agreed to a forensic examination
of its computer system. Id. at *2. Defendants hired a forensic expert who used very broad search
terms, including "profit," "loss." and "revenue."

Id. at *2 n1.3. The search terms produced ninety-

five million pages of data and the plaintiff objected to doing a privilege review of that much
material. Id. at *2. Fortunately, the judge granted relief but pointed out that the plaintiff should
ha-ve known better than to agree to the search terms that were used. Id. at *6.
102. See, e.g.. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2012) (emphasizing that a lawyer's
duty to communicate with his or her client extends throughout the representation and includes
discussing matters involving litigation that would otherwise be exclusively within the lawyer's
purview).
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10
have broad power to control discovery.o
Second, the parties themselves have
the power by agreement to modify almost any discovery rule, with the exception
of an extension of "time for discovery which requires court approval if it would
interfere with the time set for completing discovery, for hearing a motion, or for
trial."104 Third, any discovery must be evaluated based on the principle of
proportionality.10 As set forth in FRCP 26(b)(2)(C), proportionality means that
the frequency or extent of discovery may be limited if the court determines:

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain
the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues. 106
Fourth, federal j udges expect attorneys to cooperate in discovery. 107
For parties who produce material in discovery, a major risk is that privileged
material will be inadvertently produced. 10
As discussed above, FRE 502
provides a measure of protection to producing parties, but many uncertainties
exist with regard to that rule.109 In counseling and representing clients, the duty
of competency requires lawyers to be aware of these uncertainties.no

103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), 26(c).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 29(b).
105. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010) ("[A]ll
permissible discovery must be measured against the yardstick of proportionality.").
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
107. The federal rules do not contain a specific duty to cooperate, although FRCP Rule 37 is
labeled "Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions." FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
However, the Sedona Conference, a nonprofit organization devoted to the study and advancement
of the law in complex litigation and related subjects, has issued a Cooperation Proclamation by
which it seeks to facilitate "cooperative, collaborative, and transparent discovery." See THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE. TiHE SEDONA CONFERENCE COOPERATION PROCLAMATION: RESOLTRCES
FOR THE JUDICIARY 2 (Ronald J. Hedges & Kenneth J. Withers eds., 2012), available at https://
thesedonaconference.org/judicial resources. Numerous federal court decisions have endorsed the
principle of cooperation. See Barkett, supra note 80. at 45-47 (collecting cases in which courts
have endorsed the Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation).
108. See Anthony Francis Bruno, Note, Preserving Attornev-Client Privilege in the Age of
Electronic Discoverv 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 541, 543 (2010).
109. See supra Part IIIA-B.
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2012) ("Paragraph (c) requires a
lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against
unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the
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Under Rule 502(a), if a party discloses documents subject to ACP or WPP,
the production amounts to a waiver of privilege with respect to "undisclosed
communication or information" if the disclosure is intentional, the disclosed and
undisclosed communications relate to the same subject matter, and "they ought
in fairness to be considered together."'' The term "intentional" is undefined in
the rule and, as discussed below in connection with the term "inadvertent" in
Rule 502(b),'" is ambiguous. In addition, suppose a party concludes that it is to
its advantage to intentionally disclose information in connection with a federal
proceeding. For example, suppose in connection with an investigation by the
SEC, a company wants to disclose privileged material to the SEC. If it does so.
can it prevent the disclosure from being a subject matter waiver in related civil
cases? If so. how? If it cannot, then the party faces a Hobson's choice in
responding to the SEC investigation. 14
Rule 502(b) deals with "inadvertent" rather than "intentional" disclosure.'
The duty of competency requires lawyers to understand that courts are divided
on the meaning of inadvertent.' 6 Some courts have held that when a lawyer is
involved in the process of disclosing information, even a disclosure resulting
from a mistake of judgment qualifies as inadvertent. 1 This may be referred to
as the "lawyer involvement approach." Other courts have decided that whether a
disclosure is inadvertent depends on a number of factors, including the number
of documents involved, the level of care with which the privilege review was
conducted, and the conduct of the producing party after the production.118 This
may be referred to as the "factor approach."
A court might consider Comment 2 to ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) as a
definition of "inadvertent." 119 That comment seems to equate "inadvertent" with
"accidental":

lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject
to the lawyer's supervision.").
111. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
112. Grimm et al., supra note 22, at 20.
113. See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging
that defendant must choose between waiving WPP by cooperating with authorities or risk a civil
fraud suit for refusing to cooperate, but finding such a "Hobson's choice" insufficient for creating
an exception to the waiver doctrine).
115. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
116. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 crmt. 5 (2012) ("Competent
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of
the problem . ..

).

117. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[W]e do not think it
matters whether the waiver is labeled 'voluntary' or 'inadvertent' . . ..").

But see Amobi v. D.C.

Dep't of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting the argument that a document disclosure
made by a lawyer can never be inadvertent).
118. Grimm et al., supra note 22, at 29-30 (quoting Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 658 59
(N.D. 111.2009)).
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2012).
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A document or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent
when it is accidently transmitted, such as when an email or letter is
misaddressed or a document or electronically stored information is
accidently included with information that was intentionally
transmitted.
This may be referred to as the "accidental approach."
In Amobi v. D.C. DepartmentofCorrections,121 the court rejected the claim
that involvement of a lawyer in the privilege review prevented the disclosure
from being inadvertent:
[T]o find that a document disclosed by a lawyer is never inadvertent
would vitiate the entire point of Rule 502(b). Concluding that a
lawyer's mistake never qualifies as inadvertent disclosure under Rule
502(b) would gut that rule like a fish. It would essentially reinstate the
strict waiver rule in cases where laxvers reviewed documents, and it
would create a perverse incentive not to have attorneys review
documents for privilege. 122
Instead, the court concluded that "inadvertent" should be interpreted to mean
"mistaken" or "unintended."
This may be referred to as the "mistake
approach."
The decision in Amobi, however, is unclear as to what qualifies as a
mistake.124 In Barnett v. Aultman Hospital,'12 the court adopted a broad concept
of mistake. 126 In Barnett, the defendant produced "handwritten notes ... taken
by defendant's Vice President of Human Resources in connection with a
conversation ... with defendant's counsel."
Defendant's counsel did not
know that the notes had been produced until plaintiffs counsel introduced them
into evidence at the deposition of the vice president.128 Prior to production, the
documents at issue were reviewed by defendant's counsel.1
A paralegal at the

120. Id. (emphasis added).

121. 262 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 2009).
122. Id. at 54.
123. Id. at 53: accord Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032.
1038 (N.D. 111.2009).
124. See Amobi. 262 F.R.D. at 53-54 (providing that the simplest analysis for determining if a
disclosure was inadvertent would be to analyze whether the disclosure was unintended or a mistake,
but not providing any concrete examples of what constitutes a mistake).
125. No. 5:11 CV 399, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53733 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2012).
126. See id. at *8-9 (discussing the facts of the disclosure and concluding that whether the
documents provided were not recognized as privileged when they were disclosed, or if the
disclosure was simply a mistake, did not change the fact that the disclosure was inadvertent).
127. Id. at *2.
128. Id. at *3.
129. Id. at *2.
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firm partially redacted one of the pages, but privileged material remained.130
With regard to Rule 502(b)(1), the court adopted a broad conception of
inadvertent:
It is unclear to the [c]ourt after considering the testimony of defendant's
attorneys Hearey and Billington, whether the unredacted content of the
documents at issue were not recognized by defendant as privileged
before the documents were disclosed, or whether the documents were
recognized as privileged and disclosed by mistake. However, either
way under Rule 502(b), the disclosure was inadvertent.131
In my opinion, the "lawyer involvement approach" is unsound because it
means that almost any production of a privileged document amounts to a waiver.
If a lawyer was involved in review of the information, the privilege would be
waived because the production was not inadvertent.132 If a lawyer was not
involved in the privilege review, the privilege would probably be lost because
the absence of any lawyer review would probably mean that the second
requirement for avoidance of waiver-taking reasonable steps to avoid
production of privileged material
-would not be met. The "factor approach"
is also unsound because it combines the first element of Rule 502(b)"inadvertence"134 -with the other two elements of reasonable precautions and
reasonable steps to rectify a disclosure.
The "accidental approach" should be
rejected because it employs too narrow a concept of "inadvertent." Under this
approach, lawyer mistakes, production of documents that had not been reviewed,
and production of documents using technologically assisted review (TAR) of
ESI would not be treated as inadvertently produced because the production may
have been mistaken or unintended, but not accidental. In other words, limiting
the meaning of "inadvertent" to accidental means that the most important types
of cases in which privileged information is produced would not be covered by
Rule 502(b). This approach seems inconsistent with the purposes of the rule to

130. Id. at *8.
131. Id. at *8-9 (citing Valentin v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 09 Civ. 9448(GBD)(JCF),
2011 WL 1466122, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14. 2011) ("Disclosure is unintentional even if a document
is deliberately produced, where the producing party fails to recognize its privileged nature at the
time of production.")). Even though the disclosure was inadvertent, the court found that the
defendant waived the privilege because it failed to adopt reasonable precautions to protect
privileged material from disclosure: the number of documents reviewed was relatively small, time
pressure for disclosure did not exist, counsel had failed to prepare a privilege log, the documents
were not marked as confidential, and no procedure or protocol was followed to prevent disclosure of
privileged material. Id. at *9.
132. See Amobi v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2009).
133. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2).
134. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(1).
135. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2}-(3).
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eliminate disputes about inadvertent disclosures and to reduce costs associated
with privilege reviews.
The decisions in Amobi and Barnett, which define "inadvertent" to mean
"mistaken," 1 seem sound. However, the courts' analysis needs to be taken a
step further to carry out the purposes of the rule, one of which is increased
predictability of when a waiver of privilege occurs.1 8 Mistakes in production of
privileged material can occur in three ways: failure to identify a document as
possibly privileged because the document is overlooked either by electronic or
mistake as to what qualifies as a
human review (mistaken identification),
privileged document even when the document has been identified as possibly
privileged (mistaken review), 140 and mistake in production when, for example, a
box of privileged material is sent to the opposing party when it should not have
been (mistaken production).14 1 For the reasons given above, more limited
definitions of inadvertent are unsound as a matter of policy. In my opinion, a
court should define the concept of "inadvertent" broadly to include mistakes in
identification, review, and production. Of course, even if the court adopts a
broad concept of inadvertent, waiver can still result if the producing party failed
to take reasonable steps to prevent the inadvertent production.142
With regard to the meaning of "intentional" in Rule 502(a), consider First
American Corelogic, Inc. v. Fiserv, Inc.143 First American filed privileged
emails in support of its motion for a protective order regarding communications
with two former employees.144 First American filed the emails under seal but
not in camera and served them on all defendants.145 Defendants contended that
First American had intentionally disclosed the emails resulting in a subject

136. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note.
137. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
138. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note ("The rule seeks to provide a predictable,
uniform set of standards under which parties can determine the consequences of a disclosure of a
communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product
protection.").

139. See, e.g.. D'Onofrio v. Seaside Park, No. 09-6220, 2012 WL 1949854, at *2 (D.N.J. May
30, 2012) (explaining situation wvhere a clerical employee tasked with separating privileged
documents from nonprivileged documents overlooked four boxes of documents during her review,
resulting in the disclosure of privileged information in those boxes).
140. See, e.g., Inhalation Plastics, Inc. v. Medex Cardio-Pulmonary, Inc., No. 2:07-CV 116,
2012 WE 3731483, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2012) (finding that the producing party failed to
take reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure wvhere one out of every twenty-two
produced documents were privileged, even though all documents were reviewed by several
attorneys tasked with identifying privileged material).
141. See Barnett v. Aultman Hosp., No. 5:11 CV 399. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53733, at *9
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2012) (holding that producing party failed to show that reasonable steps were
taken to prevent disclosure after that party identified privileged information, but failed to take
proper steps to ensure that the documents were not provided to the opposing party).
142. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2).

143. No. 2: 10 CV 132 TJW, 2010 WL 4975566 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2010).
144. Id. at *1.
145. Id.
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matter waiver.146 The court held that the emails were not inadvertently
disclosed, so the privilege was waived as to the emails, but that there was no
subject matter waiver because the disclosure was not intentional. 1'
In my
opinion, the court's result is sound but not its analysis. To create three
categories-inadvertent, intentional, and something in between-is confusing
and unnecessary. The court in First American was driven to this approach
because it seems to have defined "inadvertent" to mean "accidental,"
and the
filing in First American was, in my opinion, clearly not accidental. The better
approach is to define "inadvertent" broadly to mean "mistaken" as discussed
above.'
Under this approach, the filing in First American was mistaken and
therefore inadvertent. Since it was inadvertent, it was not intentional under
502(a), and therefore subject matter waiver did not result.150 However, waiver
would still result as to the specific emails in question under FRE 502(b) because
the plaintiff failed to use reasonable precautions to prevent the disclosure; all
the plaintiff had to do, as the court pointed out, was to file in camera, not simply
under seal.1 Even if a disclosure is found to be intentional under FRE 502(a),
the disclosure will not result in a subject matter waiver except in unusual
situations: "[A] subject matter waiver (of either privilege or work product) is
reserved for those unusual situations in which fairness requires a further
disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent a selective and
misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adversary." 53
Assuming the holder of a privilege has inadvertently disclosed information
or communications that are subject to ACP or WPP, the second requirement that
the holder of the privilege must establish to avoid waiver by disclosure is that the
holder "took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure." 154
What are reasonable efforts? The Rule itself does not provide any
guidance.155 However, the Advisory Committee's Note identifies the following
factors:
* the reasonableness of precautions taken;

146. Id.
147. Id. at *3.
148. Id. at *5.
149. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
150. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a)(1).
151. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2).
152. FirstAmerican, 2010 WL 4975566, at *3.
153. FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory committee's note, cited iith approval in Silverstein v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 4949959, at *12 (D. Colo. Dec. 14,
2009).
154. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2).
155. See Amobi v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing FED. R. EVID.
502(b) advisory committee's note) (asserting that even though the Advisory Committee provided
non-dispositive factors" that may be considered by the court in determining whether reasonable
steps to prevent disclosure were taken, "the Committee indicates that it consciously chose not to
codify any factors in the rule because the analysis should be flexible and should be applied on a case
by case basis").
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*

the time taken to rectify the error;
the scope of discovery;
the extent of disclosure;
the overriding issue of fairness;
the number of documents to be reviewed;
the time constraints for production;
depending on the circumstances, the use of advanced analytical software
and analytical tools in screening for privileged material; and
* the implementation of an efficient system of records management prior
to litigation may also be relevant. 16
Under Rule 502(b)(3), the holder of a privilege, to avoid waiver. must show
that he or she "promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if
applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B)."
The case
law is clear: the holder of the privilege has the burden of proving the elements
necessary to avoid disclosure.1
Under Rules 502(b)(2) and (3), the inquiry into reasonableness pre- and
post-production is fact specific; a party or its counsel can fail to meet the
requirements of reasonableness in many ways, resulting in waiver of
privileges.
For example, a party's reliance solely on key word searches or
failure to implement proper quality control procedures with regards to its search
methodology are factors supporting a conclusion that reasonable precautions
were not taken. 160 Compliance with Rule 502(b)(2) requires the holder of the

156. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee's note. The first five factors listed were set out
in cases decided before Rule 502 was enacted. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D.
323. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D.
103. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). The Advisory Committee provided the last four factors. FED. R. EVID.
502(b) advisory committee's note.
157. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
158. See, e.g., Callan v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 564, 566 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(finding that the holder of privilege did not meet its burden of showing that the disclosure to the
opposing party was inadvertent); Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., No. 08 C 3060, 2009 WL 4403364, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2009) ("The burden is on [the producing party] to prove all three of the elements
in FRE 502."); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251. 259 (D. Md. 2008) (The
holders of the privilege "bear the burden of proving that their conduct was reasonable for purposes
of assessing whether they waived attorney-client privilege."). But see Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg.
Materials Corp. of Am.. 254 F.R.D. 216, 223 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (indicating that party seeking to
overcome claim of privilege-i.e., establish a waiver bore the burden of proot).
159. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
160. See Rhoads Indus., 254 F.R.D. at 224; see also Victor Stanley. Inc., 250 F.R.D. at 257
("The only prudent way to test the reliability of the keyword search is to perform some appropriate
sampling of the documents determined to be privileged and those determined not to be in order to
arrive at a comfort level that the categories are neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive."); In re
Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650. 662 (M.D. Fla. 2007) ("Common sense dictates that
sampling and other quality assurance techniques must be employed to meet requirements of
completeness."). See generally Symposium, The Sedona Coniference Best Practices Counentary
on the Use of Search and hIformation Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189,
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privilege to provide details of its procedures to protect against inadvertent
disclosures; general affidavits that materials were reviewed by experienced
paralegals and counsel are insufficient.161 Significant unexplained delay in
failing to assert a claim of privilege once the holder of the privilepe becomes
aware of the disclosure is likely to result in a finding of waiver. 16 Lawyers'
duty of competency requires them to be aware of both the general principle of
pre- and post-disclosure reasonableness as well as the case law providing details
as to what amounts to reasonable conduct, particularly with regard to search
methodologies to identify privileged material. 63 Because search methodologies
are technologically based, competency in discovery requires lawyers to become
knowledgeable about the technology involved in search methodology.164
Competence does not mean that lawyers must be experts in the technicalities of
search methodology; by way of analogy, a lawyer does not need to be a doctor to
handle a medical malpractice case, but the lawyer must be knowledgeable about
the medical aspects that are relevant to the case.165 One particularly useful way
for lawyers to become knowledgeable in this area is through the annual
Georgetown Advanced eDiscovery Institute. 166
When privileged material is identified, assertion of a claim of privilege
requires the holder to prepare a privilege log. 6'
In In re Denture Cream
Products Liability Litigation,168 the court outlined the following elements for a
proper privilege log:

194-95, 201-02 (2007) (providing practical advice on e-discovery retrieval methods and discussing
common issues with kevord searches).
161. See U.S. Home Corp. v. Settlers Crossing, LLC, No. DKC 08-1863, 2012 WL 3025111,
at *8 (D. Md. July 23, 2012): see also Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Vill. of Park Forest, Nos.
08 C 1225. 08-C-0869, 08-C-4303, 2011 WL 3489828, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (finding that
defendant failed to show reasonableness of precautions taken by claiming that it spent "countless
hours reviewing a relatively large amount of documents" and marking privileged documents
accordingly).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07 1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL
2905474, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (finding a waiver of privilege where plaintiff claimed
privilege over three months after being put on notice of the disclosure of privileged material).
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cnt. 19 (2012).
164. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Laivyers Have ProftssionalResponsibilities as 7hey Relate to
Electronically Stored Ji/brnation, INSIDECOUNSEL (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.
comi/2012/12/21/lawyers-have-professional-responsibilities-as-they (discussing a recent amendment
to the Model Rules for Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1, Comment 8, that indicates a competent
lawyer needs to have some knowledge with respect to benefits and risks associated with
technology).
165. See id.
166. See The Advanced eDiscoveiy Institute, GEORGETOWN LAw, https://www.1aw.
georgetown.edu continuing-legal-education/programs/cle/ediscovery-institute/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2013).
167. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A).
168. No. 09-2051-MD-ALTONAGA/SIMONTON, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151014 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 18, 2012).
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(1) the name and job title or capacity of the author of the document;
(2) the name and job title or capacity of each recipient of the
document;
(3) the date the document was prepared and if different, the date(s)
on which it was sent to or shared with persons other than the author(s);
(4) the title and description of the document;
(5) the subject matter addressed in the document;
(6) the purpose(s) for which it was prepared or communicated; and
(7) the specific basis for the claim that it is privileged.169
Failure to prepare a proper privilege log can result in waiver of the privilege as to
the materials not included in the log.170
Compliance with ethical obligations regarding IPPI also applies to receiving
and producing parties.
Under FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), a party who has produced
materials claimed to be subject to ACP or WPP may notify the other party.172
On receipt of the notice, the receiving "party must promptly return, sequester, or
destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose
the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve
the information if the party disclosed it before being notified."173 The receiving
party has the option of filing a motion under seal seeking a determination of
whether ACP or WPP wNould apply to the material, or the receiving party can
await action by the producing party. 174 If the information has been returned to
the producing party, that party must preserve the material pending a judicial
determination of the claim of privilege.
This rule applies only when the
receiving party has received notice that produced materials are subject to a claim
of ACP or WPP.06 However, ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) imposes a duty on a
party who receives material that the party knows or reasonably should know was
inadvertently sent to notify the other party who can then take corrective action to
protect any claim of privilege.
Some jurisdictions, however, have not adopted

169. Id at *47-48 (quoting Roger Kennedy Constr.. Inc. v. Anmerisure Ins. Co.. No. 6:06-cv1075-Orl-19KRS, 2007 WL 1362746, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2007)).
170. See Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 226 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(finding waiver of privilege as to documents not listed on privilege log). But see U.S. Fire Ins. Co.
v. City of Warren, No. 2:10 CV 13128, 2012 WL 1454008, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2012)
(holding that failure to file a proper privilege log need not be a waiver and in any event would apply
only to specific documents that were not listed).
171. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (imposing requirements on the receiving party after being
notified that information it has received is subject to a claim of privilege).

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id
175. Id
176. See id.

177.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2012).
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Model Rule. 4.4.178 In addition, the fact that material is labeled as ACP or WPP
does not necessarily mean that the receiving party has a duty to inform the
producing party because the material may not have been inadvertently produced
and because it is well known that many documents so labeled are not in fact
privileged.179
The combination of FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) and ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) raises
ethical issues for both producing and receiving lawyers. 80 From these rules, a
producing lawyer cannot be confident that a receiving party will notify the
producing party of the receipt of privileged material. FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) does not
impose a notification requirement.
ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) may not apply in
the given jurisdiction.182 Even if it does, the receiving party may conclude that it
does not know that the material was inadvertently sent even if it is labeled as
ACP or WPP.
Receiving parties may also face ethical problems. If Rule 4.4(b) applies and
the receiving party obtains material that is labeled as ACP or WPP, should they
inform the sending part) or should they conclude that they need not do so
because they do not know that the material has been inadvertentl sent? If Rule
4.4 does not apply, may a receiving party as a matter of professional discretion
inform the sending party of the possible receipt of privileged material, or does
the lawyer's duty to his or her client require the lawyer to use the material until a
court determines otherwise?
As the preceding discussion shows, attorneys in federal court litigation face
a host of legal and ethical problems in dealing with IPPI. 18 However, lawyers
have an extremely useful tool for dealing with many of these problems-the
clawback order-which may either incorporate an agreement of the parties or be
issued as a protective order on motion of one of the parties.184 A comprehensive
clawback order can deal with a number of the issues lawyers face. The order
could specify the amount of pre-production privilege review that lawyers are

178. See Schaefer, supra note 3, at 195 (citations omitted) (identifying states that have adopted
Model Rule 4.4(b) or its substantial equivalent, and noting that "[i]n ... ten states, no professional
conduct rule addresses the recipient's ethical obligations.").
179. Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., No. 09 C 3607. 2010 WL 4977228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2,
2010).
180. See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
181. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B) ("[T]he party making the claim [of privilege] may notify
any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it." (emphasis added)).
182. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Part IV.B.
184. See FED. R. Cly. P. 16(b)(3)(iv) (providing that a scheduling order may "include any
agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege ... after information is produced");
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (allowing the court to issue protective orders in the event of
inadvertent disclosure); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) committee's note to 2000 amendment ("[P]arties enter
agreements-sometimes called 'clawback agreements'-that production without intent to waive
privilege or protection should not be a waiver .7... ).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

604

[VOL. 64: 581

required to undertake, or even eliminate that requirement entirely; 18 could
define more precisely the ambiguous term "inadvertent";186 could specify postproduction notification requirements;
could impose obligations on parties that
receive privileged material to notify the sender that such material has been
received;188 could reduce the risk of subject matter waiver; 8 and could deal
with other matters, such as the requirements for a privilege log and imposition of
costs associated with IPPILo'o Unfortunatel), some unresolved legal issues
hamper the use of clawback orders. 191 As a result, many lawyers fail to seek
such orders, and orders that are obtained are often incomplete. 193
V.

ISSUES INVOLVING CLAWBACK ORDERS

A.

Narrow InterpretationsofFederalRule ofEvidence 502(d)

A number of courts have narrowly interpreted the power to issue clawback
orders.19 4 Some of these cases, although decided before the adoption of FRE

185. See, e.g., U.S. Home Corp. v. Settlers Crossing, LLC, No. DKC 08-1863, 2012 WL
3025111, at *5 (D. Md. July 23, 2012) (discussing how party agreements can supplant the
requirement of reasonable privilege review).
186. See, e.g., id. at *5 (noting that Rule 502(b) is merely a default rule that may be altered by
court order).
187. See, e.g., FED. R. Cly. P. 26(f) committee's note to 2006 amendment ("A casemanagement or other order including such agreements may further facilitate the discovery
process.").
188. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 109TH CONG., REPORT OF
THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 28 (2005), available at http:/www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/'CV5-2005.pdf
("[Parties] may agree that if
privileged ... information is inadvertently produced, the producing party may by timely notice
assert the privilege . . . and obtain return of the materials without waiver.").
189. See VLT, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1319, 1320 (D. Mass.
2003) (discussing a protective order that contained the language "[i]nadvertent production of
docurments subject to ... privilege shall not constitute a waiver of the immunity or privilege").
190. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(iv) (providing that a scheduling order may
"include any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege . . . after information is
produced").

191. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Cmty. Bank v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 81 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1162, 1167
(S.D. Ind. 2010) (noting that counsel failed to agree on how to handle inadvertent production).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Cinergy Corp., No. 1:99-cy-01693-LJM-JMS. 2009 WL
6327414, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2009) (finding that a protective order failed to mention ACP and
contained a "sort of claw-back provision" that protected confidential information only if it was
labeled "confidential"); Sullivan v. Stryker Corp., No. 3:10-CV-0177 (MAD/DEP), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60887 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2011) (failing to mention pre-production privilege review).
194. See, e.g., Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 118 (D.N.J.
2002) (explaining that "blanket" clawback provisions are ill-advised and such provisions should not
be broadly construed): Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd.. 916 F. Supp. 404, 412 (D.N.J. 1995)
(finding waiver of attomey client privilege despite the existence of a "blanket" clawvback
provision).
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502(d) in 2008,15 continue to have effect inder FRE 502(d).196 Perhaps the
leading anticlawback-order case is Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd.197 In CibaGeigy, the court rejected the defendant's interpretation of the protective order as
allowing it to disclose documents that were privileed and reclaim those
documents as long as the disclosure was unintentional.19 The court found that a
"blanket" inadvertent disclosure provision was "inconsistent with controlling
case law."i99 Instead, in order to maintain privilege, a producing party was
required to conduct a reasonable privilege review before producing
information. 200 Additionally, the court in Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry
Seal, Inc.201 provided the rationale for rejecting "blanket" protective orders:
[T]he court observes that such blanket provisions, essentially
immunizing attorneys from negligent handling of documents, could lead
to sloppy attorney review and improper disclosure which could
jeopardize clients' cases. Moreover, where the interpretation of the
provision remains hotly disputed, as it is in this case, broad construction
is ill advised. 0 2
While Ciba-Geigy and Koch Materials are both pre-FRE 502 cases,203 some
decisions after the adoption of Rule 502 also show a remarkable hostility to
clawback agreements.
In United States v. Sensient Colors,20 he parties
entered into a joint discovery plan that included nonwaiver and inadvertent
disclosure provisions to protect privileged material. 0 6 The court held, however,

195. Act of Sept. 19. 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-332. 122 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended at FED
R. EVID. 502).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07 1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL
2905474, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (citing Ciba-Geigv Corp.. 916 F. Supp. at 411) (noting that
the pre-FRE 502 approach of Ciba-Geigy is in essence the same as the approach of FRE 502).
197. 916 F. Supp. at 412-14 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that defendants did not take reasonable
precautions to preserve confidentiality of document by inadvertently producing it and thereby
waived attorney-client privilege regarding the document).
198. Id. at 411-12.
199. Id. at412.
200. Id.
201. 208 F.R.D. 109 (D.N.J. 2002).
202. Id. at 118.
203. Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was adopted in 2008, see supra note 195, and iba-Geigy
and Koch Mlaterialswere decided in 1995 and 2002, respectively. See supra note 194.
204. See, e.g., U.S. Home Corp. v. Settlers Crossing, LLC, No. DKC 08-1863, 2012 WL
3025111, at *6 (D. Md. July 23, 2012) (finding that waiver disputes are governed by FRE 502
instead of the parties' clawback provision); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07 1275
(JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Sept. 9,2009) (requiring parties to comply with FRE
502's standards in addition to the parties' alleged clawback provision).
205. Sensient Colors, 2009 WL 2905474.
206. Id. at *2.
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that these provisions did not excuse the parties from compliance with FRE 502
while citing Ciba-Geigy207 and quoting with approval from Koch Materials. 208
Indeed, the prevailing approach seems to be that the standards set forth in
Rule 502 will apply unless the clawback order provides specific standards for
displacing each of the elements of Rule 502.209 As the court stated in U.S. Home
Corp. v. Settlers Crossing, LLC:210
To find that a court order or agreement under Rule 502(d) or (e)
supplants the default Rule 502(b) test, courts have required that concrete
directives be included in the court order or agreement regarding each
prong of Rule 502(b). In other words, if a court order or agreement does
not provide adequate detail regarding what constitutes inadvertence,
what precautionary measures are required, and what the producing
party's post-production responsibilities are to escape waiver, the court
will default to Rule 502(b) to fill in the gaps in controlling law.211
Other courts have taken a broader view of FRE 502(d).212 In Rajala v.
McGuire Woods, LLP,2 the court found that it had authority to enter a clawback
order even though the parties had failed to reach agreement on the terms of the
214
order.
In addition, the court concluded that FRCP 26(c) authorized entry of a
clawback order that allowed McGuire Woods to reclaim privileged documents,
even though it had not concluded a pre-production privilege review.215 Given

207. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 502(b); Ciba-Geigy Corp., 916 F. Supp. 404).
208. Id. (quoting Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 118 (D.N.J.

2002)).
209. US. Home, 2012 WL 3025111 at *5.
210. 2012 WL 3025111.
211. Id. at *5. For a further discussion, see, e.g., Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felnan Prod., Inc.,
271 F.R.D. 125, 130, 133 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (following the parties' agreement regarding postproduction responsibilities, but reverting to Rule 502(b)(2) regarding required precautionary
measures because the agreement was silent on that prong), aff'd sub nom. Felman Prod., Inc. v.
Indus. RisklInsurers, No. 3:09 0481, 2010 WL 2944777 (S.D. W. Va. July 23, 2010); Luna GamingSan Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cy2804 BTM (VfMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (applying Rule 502(b) despite the existence of a court order that provided
for a general nonwaiver of privilege for inadvertent disclosure because that court order failed to
offer detailed instructions regarding post-production responsibilities); United States v. Sensient
Colors, Inc., No. 07 1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (applying Rule
502(b) despite a general nonwaiver agreement, in part, because "[n]owhere in the [agreement] does
it mention that the parties are excused form [sic] the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
502(b)" (citing FED. R. EVID. 502(b))).
212. See, e.g., Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., Nos. 1:10CV00037, 1:10CV00041, 2012 WL
2526982, at * 4 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012) ("[I]n the world of ESI. new perspectives and approaches
are needed to complete discovery in an efficient and reasonable manner."); Rajala v. McGuire
Woods, LLP, No. 08 2638 CM DJW, 2010 WL 2949582. at *5 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (interpreting
courts to enter a clawvback provision even in the absence of agreement by the parties).
213. Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582.
214. Id. at *5 (citing FED. R. Cil. P. 26(c)(1)).
215. Id. at *7.
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the number of documents McGuire Woods was required to review, the court
found that a broad protective order would reduce the expense and burden of
discovery for both parties. 216 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a
broad clawback order would deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to show that
McGuire Woods failed to use reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure because
accetance of this argument would "defeat the purpose behind Rule 502(d) and
(e). "
Similarly, in 4dair v. EQT Production Co., 218 the magistrate court issued a
discovery order providing for electronic searching of documents to narrow the
universe of potentially privileged documents, followed by production of other
documents without individualized privilege review.219 The court's order
included a clawback provision that protected against the use of privileged
documents that were revealed and a protective provision that prevented
disclosure of nonrelevant documents outside the litigation.220 The defendant
objected that it was being ordered to produce privileged material. 221 The court
disagreed.
It held that the risk of disclosure of privileged information was
present in any document-intensive case, whether a privilege review was
conducted manually or electronically.223 The court concluded that the defendant
had "not shown that the use of electronic searching would substantially increase
the number of inadvertently produced privileged documents such that electronic
searching is an unacceptable form of document review."224
B.

Issues Regarding Clawback Orders

The cases discussed in the preceding section raise a number of issues about
clawback orders that require resolution before such orders can achieve wider use.
1.

Does a Court Have the Authority to Issue a Clawback
Order Without Party Agreement?

The answer to this question is almost certainly "yes," even though the rule
itself is unclear on the point.225 Rule 502(e) states that a court order may
incorporate an agreement by the parties;226 Rule 502(d) states that a court may
issue an order that ACP or WPP is not waived by disclosure connected with the

216. Id
217. Id
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Nos. 1:10CV00037, 1:1 OCV00041, 2012 WL 2526982 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012).
Id at *2-3.
Id at *4 & n6.
Id at *3.
Id at *4.
Id
Id
See FED. R. EVID. 502.
FED. R. EVID. 502(e).
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litigation before the court, in which case the order operates in any other federal
or state proceeding. 7 Although Rule 502(d) does not specifically authorize a
court to issue an order on its own, 2 the Advisory Committee's Note states:
"Under the rule, a confidentiality order is enforceable whether or not it
memorializes an agreement among the parties to the litigation. Party,a reement
should not be a condition of enforceability of a federal court's order."
In addition, the Statement of Congressional Intent states that Rule 502(d)
is designed to enable a court to enter an order, whether on motion of one
or more parties or on its own motion, that will allow the parties to
conduct and respond to discovery expeditiously, without the need for
exhaustive pre-production privilege reviews, while still preserving each
party's right to assert the privilege ...230
Moreover, it should be noted that if party agreement was a prerequisite to
clawback orders, the utility of such orders would be dramatically reduced.
Parties easily can fail to agree about a clawback agreement either in principle or
in detail. Further, depending on the case, a party could use its failure to agree to
a clawback agreement as a tactical weapon.
In Rajala v. MeGuire foods, LLP.,231 the court concluded that it had the
authority to issue a clawback order without agreement of the parties.n2 While it
cited the Advisory Committee's Notes and the Statement of Congressional
Intent,233 the court ultimately based its authority on FRCP 26(c)(1), 3 which
provides that a court may "for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense." 235

227. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
228. Id.
229. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
230. 154 CONG. REc. 18017 (2008) (emphasis added) (Statement of Congressional Intent
Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
231. No. 08 2638 CM DJW, 2010 WE 2949582 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010).
232. Id. at *5.
233. Id. at *4 (citing FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note, 154 Cong. Rec. 18017
(2008) (Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence)).
234. Id. at *5.
235. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Other rules could be the basis of a court order providing for
clawback provisions. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii) (providing that a scheduling order
may "modify the extent of discovery"); FED. R. Cly. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (providing for court ordered
limitations on discovery if the benefit is outweighed by the burden or expense). But see FED. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv) (providing that the scheduling order may "include any agreenents the
parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material after
information is produced" (emphasis added)).
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Is a Court Required to Find "Good Cause "Jbr Issuing
a Clawback Order?

"Good cause" requires a specific factual showing of harm if the protective
order is not granted rather than a general, speculative, or conclusory claim of
injury. 3 6 Further, in deciding whether good cause exists, a court must consider
the relative harm to the nonmoving party. 2 If the court order is incorporating
an agreement of the parties, it seems unnecessary for there to be a showing of
"good cause." In this situation, the order could be based on FRE 502(d) and (e)
and on FRCP 16(b)(3)(B)(iv), all of which authorize orders incorporating
agreements of the parties without mention of "good cause."m38 However, if the
parties have not reached an agreement on clawback provisions, then the court
will probably proceed tinder FRCP 26(c)(1) as the court did in Rajala to issue a
protective order, which requires a showing of "good cause."239
3.

Does a Court Have the 4uthority in Issuing a
Clawback Order to Relieve a Partyjfom the Standards
Set Forth in FederalRule ofEvidence 502(b)?

In particular, may a court provide that disclosure of privileged material does
not constitute a waiver even if the disclosing party has taken no pre-production
steps to prevent disclosure of privileged material? One argument against judicial
power to relieve a party of the standards in Rule 502(b) is that legislative history
shows that the intent of Rule 502(b) was not to change the law dealing with the
substance or waiver of ACP or WPP. 240 The Advisory Committee's Note states:
The rule makes no attempt to alter federal or state law on whether a
communication or information is protected under the attorney-client
privilege or work-product immunity as an initial matter. Moreover,

236. Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc. v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., No. 8:10CV365, 2012 WL
1852048, at *Il (D. Neb. May 18, 2012) ("A showing of 'good cause' requires 'a particular and
specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from ... conclusory statements."') (quoting Gulf
Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n1.16 (1981): Miscellaneous Docket Matter #1 v.
Miscellaneous Docket Matter #2, 197 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 1999)).
237. Id. (quoting Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Seib Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir.
1973)).
238. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)-(e); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
239. FED. R. Ci. P. 26(c)(1) ("The court may, for good cause, issue ain order to protect a party
or person ...).
In the Rajala and Adair cases discussed above, the courts considered wvhether the
moving party had shown "good cause" for the protective order. See Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., Nos.
1: 10CV00037, 1:10CV00041, 2012 WL 2526982 at * 4 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012); Rajala v.
McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08 2638 CM DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at *6 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010);
see also Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. United States, Nos. 12-19T. 12-23T. slip op. at 6 (Fed. Cl.
filed Sept. 19, 2012) ("[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause for the
adoption of its proposed claw back standard.").
240. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note.
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while establishing some exceptions to waiver, the rule does not purport
to supplant applicable waiver doctrine generally.241
Similarly, the Statement of Con ressional Intent states that the rule has a
"limited though important purpose.
The rule addresses "only the effect of
disclosure, inder specified circumstances, of a communication" otherwise
protected by ACP or WPP.243 The Statement goes on to say: "The rule does not
alter the substantive law regarding attorney-client privilege or work-product
protection in any other respect . . . ."244 Based on this history, it can be argued
that a court order that relieves a party of the obligation to use reasonable efforts
to determine whether information is subject to privilege violates the intention of
Rule 502 because such an order operates as a major change in the law of
privilege.245 Case law prior to the adoption of Rule 502 clearly required a party
to use at least reasonable efforts to protect against disclosure of privileged
material.2
However, there are persuasive arguments against this narrow view of
judicial authority under Rule 502(d). Electronic discovery, with its potentially
enormous cost associated with privilege review, is a recent development.
Cases prior to the adoption of Rule 502 considered this development to only a
limited extent.248 In addition, one of the fundamental purposes of Rule 502 is to
reduce the cost necessary to protect against waiver of ACP and WPP.249 Court
authority to issue clawback orders that eliminate the need for pre-production
review for ACP and WPP will greatly reduce the cost and foster expeditious use
of discovery.2s Indeed, the Statement of Congressional Intent provides that the
rule will "enable a court to enter an order . . . that will allow the parties to

241. Id
242. 154 CoNG. REc. 18016 (2008) (Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
243. Id
244. Id
245. 154 CONG. REC. 18017 (2008) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("[Rule 502] protects
information inadvertently disclosed in discovery, as long as the party ... upon learning of the
disclosure, promptly takes reasonable steps to rectify it.").

246. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 413 (D.N.J. 1995) ("[T]he
Court finds that counsel has failed to establish that it undertook reasonable precautions to prevent
the inadvertent disclosure . . . ."); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D.
103. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The elements vhich go into [the waiver] determination include the
reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure . . . .").
247. 154 CONG. REC. 18017 (2008) (statement of Rep. King) ("[T]he cost of discovery has
spiked in recent years based on the proliferation of e-mail and other forms of electronic
recordkeeping.").
248. See Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 238 (D. Md. 2005).
249. See supra note 53 and accompanving text.
250. See 154 CoNG. REC. 18016 (2008) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("Concern about the
potential adverse consequences has [forced] ... lawyers to undertake exhaustive, time-consuming,
and expensive examination of documents ... before they can be comfortable turning them over in
discovery.").
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conduct and respond to discovery expeditiously, without the need for exhaustive
pre-production privilege reviews, while still preserving each party's right to
assert the privilege."
On balance, therefore, it would seem that a court should
have the authority to issue an order relieving parties of the obligation of preproduction review for privilege while still preserving their right to claim of
privilege, whether the parties have agreed to such a provision or based on a
motion of one of the parties for good cause. It follows a fortiori that a court
would also have the authority to specify levels of pre-production review rather
than eliminate that requirement entirely.
A second argument against judicial authority to dispense with preproduction privilege review is that such blanket orders are "essentially
immunizing attorneys from negligent handling of documents, [which] could lead
to sloppy attorney review and improper disclosure which could jeopardize
clients' cases." ) If the clawback order is based on agreement of the parties, or
results from a motion of a party for a protective order, this argument is weak.

251. 154 CONG. REC. 18017 (2008) (Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
252. The argument in the text in favor of court authority to eliminate or define pre-production
review while preserving privilege through a clawback agreement should also apply to Rule
502(b)(1). which requires the disclosure to be "inadvertent" to avoid waiver of the privilege. FED.
R. EvID. 502(b)(1). Inadvertence goes hand-in-hand with reasonable pre-production review.
Indeed, a number of courts have indicated that "inadvertence" is determined by a number of factors
that are similar, if not the same as, the factors for reasonable pre-production review. See CibaGeigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411 (D.N.J. 1995) (quoting Advanced Med., Inc. v.
Arden Med. Sys., Inc., No. 87-3059, 1988 WL 76128, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1988)). A court
order relieving a party of the obligation to do pre-production review, but requiring the disclosure to
be inadvertent, would leave parties in doubt as to when the claw back provision would apply. As
discussed above. courts are divided on the meaning of "inadvertent." See Schaefer, supra note 3, at
198. Some courts construe the term to mean "accidental." See supra note 148 and accompanying
text: see also Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. United States, Nos. 12-19T, 12-23T, slip op. at 7 (Fed.
Cl. filed Sept. 19, 2012) ("The Court agrees ... that the standards set forth in FRE
502(b) . . . provide . . . adequate protection against the consequences of any accidental disclosures

of privileged information that may occur in the course of discovery." (emphasis added)). Thus, a
court order requiring disclosure to be inadvertent, but also eliminating pre-production review would
seem inconsistent in itself-compliance with the order would not be an accidental disclosure, but
rather, intentional conduct to conform to the order. Therefore, a court order that eliminated preproduction review should provide that the clawback provision applies regardless of the reason for
disclosure and need not be inadvertent. If the order defines a level of pre-production review rather
than eliminating pre-production review entirely, the order should also define an "inadvertent"
disclosure. For example, the order could state that a disclosure that occurred despite compliance
with pre-production methodology set forth in the order would be treated as "inadvertent."
In contrast, the argument in the text for broad court authority should not be applied to Rule
502(b)(3)'s requirement that parties must take "reasonable [post-production] steps to rectify the
error." FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). A court should not have authority to eliminate this requirement
because it would not serve the purpose of minimizing cost in reviewing materials for privilege.
However, a court should have authority to define in its order specifically what this requirement
entails, for example, by specifying time periods and form of notice. See FED. R. CIV. P.
16(b)(3)(B).
253. Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 118 (D.N.J. 2002).
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Among the duties lawyers owe their clients are of competency 2 and
communication.255
Before entering into an agreement that would be
incorporated into an order or seeking a protective order, an attorney has an
obligation to discuss with the client the advantages, disadvantages, and risks
associated with such an agreement or order.256 For a producing party, this
discussion may include an analysis of the relative risks of producing privileged
material compared to the cost savings from not having to do extensive privilege
review.257 If a client, after proper consultation with its lawyer, agrees to such a
provision or authorizes counsel to seek such a protective order, it is wrong to
characterize the resulting agreement or order as immunizing lawyers from
negligent handling of documents.
Third, it has been claimed that judicial power to issue clawback orders that
relieve parties of pre-production review for privilege improperly shifts the
burden of determining privilege to the recipient.258 When the clawback order
approves an agreement of the parties, this argument is also weak. A party
receiving discovery may have some additional burden imposed on it by virtue of
a clawback order, but that party also receives the benefit of faster responses to
discovery requests. In addition, the receiving party may also avoid the risk of
cost-shifting if its discovery requests are burdensome. 2 These advantages and
disadvantages are for the receiving client to decide after consultation with its
lawyer. 260
If the clawback order is not the result of agreement between the parties, then
the argument that the moving party is shifting the burden of determining
privilege to the recipient has weight, but is not conclusive. In deciding whether

254. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012).
255. Id. R. 1.4.
256. See id. This also implicates ABA Model Rule 1.1 because "[t]o represent a client
competently in a Rule 26(t) conference, a lawyer must have the ability to discuss and negotiate in
necessary detail a number of ESI-related topics, including ... the burdens associated with collection
and production ... and agreements to protect inadvertently produced privileged information."
Katherine G. Maynard, Ethical Obligations 4rising in Electronic Discovely, ROBINSON BRADSHAW
& HINSON (Nov. 2007), http://www.rbh.com/files/Publication/3631f755-2316-4cad-a783-e2cc527
db58b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6b5610f8-7a66-4cfe-b501-ec57168303bb/article kmaynard
ethical.pdf.
257. See Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005) ("[R]ecord-byrecord pre-production privilege review, on pain of subject matter waiver, would impose upon
parties costs of production that bear no proportionality to what is at stake in the litigation . . . .").
258. See Jessica Wang, Comment, Nonwaiver A4greenents After Federal Rule of Evidence
502: A Glance at Quick-Peek and Claiback Agreemnents, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1848 (2009).
The receiving lawyer also may have an ethical burden imposed when privileged documents are
received. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2012) ("If a lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that such a document or electronically stored information was sent
inadvertently then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that
person to take protective measures.").
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) committee's note to 2006 amendment (outlining the factors for
determining whether cost-shifting will occur).
260. See MODEL RULES PROF' CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2012).
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the movant has established "good cause," the court should consider the harm to
the nonmoving party.261 In addition, the court, in its order, can ameliorate any
burden on the receiving party by requiring the producing party to notify the
recipient within a specified period of time after it becomes aware that it has
disclosed information subject to ACP or WPP. 262
Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United States263 is an example of a case in
which a court found that the moving party failed to establish "good cause" for a
clawback order that relieved it of obligations to perform pre-production privilege
review.264 The case was a tax refund suit in which Potomac Electric (Pepco)
sought a protective order with two disputed provisions.265 One provision would
provide that any intentional disclosure that it made in the case would not operate
as a waiver in any other state or federal proceeding.266 The second provision
allowed Potomac to clawback any privileged documents that were disclosed to
the United States within ten days after becoming aware of the disclosure,
regardless of the degree of care used when making the disclosure.267
The United States objected to the clawback provision on the ground that it
would put the burden on the government to determine whether documents were
intentionally or inadvertently produced.268 The burden would be particularly
acute because it appeared that Pepco would be producing a number of privileged
documents intentionally to establish an advice of counsel defense.269 The
government also objected to the intentional waiver limitation on the ground that
applicable law required intentional waivers to apply to all cases.270
The court rejected both provisions proposed by Pepco, but it did grant a
general protective order that would protect Pepco from inadvertent
disclosures.271 As to the clawback provision, the court found that Pepco had
failed to establish "good cause" for the provision.
According to the court, "the
standards set forth in FRE 502(b) are both fair and sufficiently definite to
provide the parties with adequate protection against the consequences of any
accidental disclosures of privileged information that may occur in the course of
discovery."

261. See Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc. v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., No. 8:10CV365, 2012 WL
1852048, at *11 (D. Neb. May 18, 2012) (citing Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d
1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973)).
262. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
263. Nos. 12-19T, 12-23T (Fed. Cl. filed Sept. 19. 2012)
264. Id. at 6 (citing Williams v. District of Columbia, 806 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2011)).
265. Id. at 1.
266. Id at 7.
267. Id at 6-7.
268. Id. at 2.
269. See id.
270. Id at 7-8.
271. Id at 10.
272. Id. at 9.
273. Id. at 7.
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Adair v. EQT Production Co.274 exemplifies another possible argument
against court authority to issue clawback orders that eliminate pre-production
review.275 In that case, the court issued a clawback order over the objection of,
rather than on the motion of, EQT. 26 The court order specified a level of
privilege review that EQT was required to use and required EQT to produce all
the resulting documents subject to a clawback order protecting privileged
information and a protective order preventing use of irrelevant material outside
the litigation.
EQT claimed that the clawback order in essence required it to
reveal privileged information. 8 The court rejected EQT's argument on the
ground that any form of privilege review, whether manual or electronic, had the
possibility of error, and EQT had not shown that the methods ordered by the
court would substantially increase the number of inadvertently produced
documents subject to ACP or WPP.279 Adair is an unusual situation because
normally, a producing party is moving to reduce the burden of pre-production
review for privileged material.280 It can be argued that a court order preventing a
party from engaging in the privilege review it deems appropriate violates that
party's rights not to produce privileged material and to have a court
determination of whether the privilege applies to particular communications.281
After all, the producing part) will generally bear the expense of conducting the
review.282 On the other hand, a court has the power, upon a showing of good
cause, to issue discovery orders aimed at reducing delay.283 Although the fact
pattern in Adair was unusual, in essence, EQT's argument amounted to a claim
that it had the right to decide how privileged documents are identified.284 This
argument should be rejected. In the complex and expensive world of electronic
discovery, a court should have the power, upon a showing of good cause, to
decide how privilege determinations will be made.

274. Nos. :I10CV00037. 1:1OCV00041, 2012 WL 2526982 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012).
275. Id at *3-4 (rejecting EQT's argument that "[s]uch ain order ... is not justified under
either Rule 26 or Federal Rule of Evidence 502") (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26: FED. R. EvID. 502)).
276. Id. at *4.
277. Id at *3.

278. Id
279. Id. at *4.
280. See, e.g., Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228. 231 (D. Md. 2005) (noting that
"jo]ne of the Defendants' concerns was the cost and burden of performing pre-production privilege
review of the records sought by the Plaintiffs").
281. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A) (providing parties with a process for withholding
documents they believe are subject to ACP or WPP).
282. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[l]he
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests . . . ." (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
283. See FED. R. Cly. P. 16(c)(2)(P) (stating that at pre-trial conference, a court may take
action appropriate for "facilitating in other ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the
action"); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (providing for court ordered limitations on frequency and
extent of discovery).
284. See Adair. 2012 WL 2526982 at *3-4.
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May a Clawback Order Provide that Any Intentional
Disclosure Will Not Amount to a Subject Matter
W'aiver?

Another issue regarding a clawback order that relieves a party of the burden
of any pre-production review is that sometimes a disclosure of materials subject
to ACP or WPP may be "intentional."a If so, under FRE 502(a), the intentional
disclosure could result in a subject matter waiver, not only in that proceeding,
but in other proceedings as well.286 The risk of subject matter waiver may
seriously erode the benefit of the clawback order.
The legislative history of Rule 502 provides support for the contention that a
court does not have the power to limit the subject matter waiver effect of an
intentional waiver.287 The Statement of Congressional Intent states: "[T]his
subdivision does not provide a basis for a court to enable parties to agree to a
selective waiver of the privilege, such as to a federal agency conducting an
investigation, while preserving the privilege as against other parties seeking the
information." 88 The Statement goes on to provide that "acquiescence in use"
will be treated as an intentional waiver. 8
In Potomac Electric, Pepco sought court approval of a provision in a
protective order that any intentional disclosure in the case would not operate as a
waiver in any other state or federal proceeding.
The court rejected this
argument, concluding that FRE 502(d) was intended to "close the loop" that
would exist without the rule. 2 What the court meant was that in the absence of
502(d), an inadvertent waiver in one federal case could nonetheless be treated as
a waiver in other federal or state cases.292 However, according to the court, Rule
502(d) was not intended to affect intentional waivers.293 The court relied on
Congressional and Advisory Committee statements that Rule 502 does not alter
any substantive aspects regarding privilege and waiver.294
A court could attempt to deal with the problem of possible subject matter
waiver effects of an intentional disclosure in at least two ways. First, its order
could provide that any disclosure made pursuant to the order would not be
treated as intentional because it was being made pursuant to court order rather
than voluntarily. This approach may not succeed, however, if the order results

285. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a) (providing consequences for intentional waivers).
286. See id. (extending an intentional waiver to federal and state proceedings).
287. See 154 CONG. REC. 18017 (2008) (Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule
502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).

288. Id
289. Id
290. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. United States, Nos. 12-19T, 12-23T, slip op. at I (Fed. Cl.
filed Sept. 19, 2012).
291. Id at 8.
292. See id
293. Id.
294. Id. at 8-9.
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from an agreement of the parties or is the result of a motion for protective order
by the producing party. It would be difficult for a part) to argue that it did not
disclose material voluntarily when it entered into an agreement or sought an
order allowing it to do so without privilege review. Second, the order could
provide that even if the disclosure is treated as intentional, "fairness" does not
require that the waiver extend to undisclosed communications or informationi.e., a subject matter waiver-because the disclosure is being made pursuant to a
court order and is not being made for tactical reasons.
The Advisory
Committee's Note states that subject matter waiver tinder FRE 502(a) is
"reserved for those unusual situations in which fairness requires a further
disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent a selective and
misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adversary." 296
Quite clearly, a disclosure pursuant to a court order providing that the producing
party need not engage in pre-production review for materials subject to ACP or
WPP is not being done in a selective or misleading way to the disadvantage of
the other party.29
5.

Summary ofAnalysis

To summarize my conclusions regarding court authority with regard to
clawback orders:
(a) A court has the authority to issue such orders either incorporating an
agreement of the parties or on a motion by one party for a protective order. 298
(b) If the order incorporates an agreement of the parties, the order does not
require a showing of "good cause" tinder FRE 502(d).299 If the order is on a
motion of one of the parties, "good cause" should be shown under FRCP
26(c)( 1).3oo
(c) While a number of arguments can be made against judicial authority to
relieve a party of the obligation of pre-production review, the more persuasive
view is that a court can issue such an order for "good cause."so
(d) Judicial authority to issue an order relieving a party of the subject matter
waiver effect of an intentional disclosure is questionable, but a court, in
connection with an order relieving a party of privilege review, could attempt to

295. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a)(3).
296. FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory committee's note.
297. Some court decisions relying on FRE 502(a)( 3 ) have allowed what have been called
"cabined waivers." or intentional waivers limited to the particular case in wvhich the waiver occurs.
See, e.g., In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., Nos. 11 15059 (MG), 11 2790(MG) SIPA, 2012 WL
769577 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2012) (approving a protective order that granted a limiting
waiver of certain privileges concerning information relating to a specific time frame with a
provision stating that the waiver did not constitute a broader waiver under FRE 502(a)(3)).

298. See supra Part V.B.I.
299. See supra notes 236 38 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
301. See supra Part V.B.3.
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limit the potential subject matter waiver effect of such a disclosure by ruling that
the disclosure does not produce "unfairness" inder FRE 502(a)(3).3o
C.

Clawback Failures

While some legal questions exist regarding clawback orders, their potential
utility is great, but only if they are carefully crafted. As this section shows,
clawback agreements and orders can fail to achieve their intended purpose in a
number of ways.

First, lawyers may simply fail to obtain a clawback order. Community Bank
v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.303 is one example of the need for written
clawback agreements.304 In 2009, Progressive advised Community Bank that it
had inadvertently produced unredacted copies of seven pages and demanded
their return or destruction pursuant to FRCP 26(b)(5)(B).305 Community Bank
did so and, in addition, identified two other documents that may have been
inadvertently produced and destroyed those documents as well.306 Several dals
later, Progressive asked Community Bank to destroy three additional pages.
Community Bank did so; 30 at the same time its counsel wrote to Progressive as
follows:
I trust that you will be similarly accommodating if we ask for the return
of inadvertently produced privileged/protected documents in the future.
And I hope we will not face a debate about "inadvertently," diligent
review, etc. I did not even raise those issues when you asked for the
documents to be returned or destroyed, despite the small number of
documents in issue and the length of time taken to review them, etc. 309
Progressive's counsel wrote back as follows: "I appreciate your courtesy in this
regard and the consideration you afforded us in that regard. Should the occasion
arise, you can expect the same courtesy in return.,310
Several years later, Progressive served a nonparty subpoena on Community
Bank's law firm.311 When the law firm responded, it objected to production of
ACP or WPP. 32 However, when the defendant reviewed files at the law firm's

302. See supra Part V.B.4.

303. No. 1:08-cv-01443-WTL-JMS, 2010 WL 1435368 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 8, 2010).
304. Id at *3.
305. Id at *2.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
I at *1.
Id
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office, the defendant actually reviewed the firm's entire file. 3 The defendant's
access to privileged documents came to light during the deposition of one of the
law firm's partners. 314 Progressive claimed that Community Bank had waived
the privilege.31
The court denied Community Bank's motion claiming that it had not waived
the privileges.316 The court found that the language in the letter from
Progressive's counsel granting the plaintiff the same "courtesy" was too
amorphous to amount to a party agreement under Rule 502(e).3 The use of the
word "courtesy" indicated to the court that the "nature of any expected reciprocal
conduct was professional/moral in nature, not in the nature of a legal right."
In addition, the court indicated that the courtesy was limited to inadvertent
production, which may not have been the case here.319
The court then turned its analysis to Rule 502(b).320 The court found that
Community Bank, who was the owner of the privilege, did not reasonably rely
on its law firm to protect the privilege.
The court felt that the bank should
have known that generalized objections without a privilege log were
insufficient.
In addition, the court found that the bank should have examined
the documents itself to determine if any were privileged.
The court held that
the bank could not "blindly rely" on its lawyers to assert privilege claims.324
Having found against the Bank under Rule 502, the court nonetheless
granted the bank almost all of the relief it sought, excluding the documents from
substantive evidence. 3
The court based its decision on FRCP 26(b)(5)(B),
finding that Progressive violated that rule by using the disputed documents in its
summary judgment motion before the privilege issue was resolved.326
Second, the order may be unclear as to whether it is an ordinary protective
order or a clawback order. In United States v. Cinergy Corp.,327 the defendants
had hired Energy Management & Services Co. (EMS) to help determine the
feasibility of building a gas pipeline to one of its plants. 8 The agreement with
EMS was part of the remedy phase of litigation between the United States and

3 13. Id. The parties disagreed about whether this was done with or without the permission of
one of the firm's partners. See id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at *2.
316. Id. at *4-5.
317. Id. at *3.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at *4.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)).
325. Id. at *5.
326. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B)).
327. No. 1:99-cy-01693-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 6327414 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2009).
328. Id. at *1.
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the defendants. 3
EMS and the defendants entered into a confidentiality
agreement in which EMS agreed "to cooperate with Defendants if [they] chose
to seek a protective order in response to any subpoena served [by the United
States on] EMS."3'0 The United States chose to subpoena certain documents
from EMS.
Before serving the subpoena, the United States asked defendants'
Without
counsel if the subpoena implicated any privileged documents.
reviewing responsive documents, defense counsel answered in the negative, even
though the response included an email with privileged information.
Defense
counsel did not discover the email during preparation for the project manager's
deposition, but first learned of the document when plaintiffs attempted to use the
email at the deposition, at which time defense counsel objected and sought to
reclaim the email as work product under a protective order previously issued by
the court.3 34 The email was the seventh document in a set of 420 documents
consisting of 2,226 pages.'
The protective order had been entered before FRE
502 went into effect.3
The court rejected defendants' argument that it should be able to reclaim the
email.3' 7 The court first noted that FRE 502 applied, even though it had not been
discussed by the parties, because the disclosure occurred in a federal
proceeding.
The court then discussed whether a court order or party
The court found
agreement tinder the Federal Rules of Evidence was in effect.
that a protective order previously entered by the court did not amount to an
agreement tinder Rule 502. 340 The order provided for exchange of confidential
information, but it had a different purpose than a clawback agreement. 4 The
protective order was designed to allow for exchange of confidential information
without fear that it would be shared with the public or used for purposes other
than the litigation. 42 The court noted that the protective order had "a sort of
claw-back provision" which allowed a party to reclaim "unlabeled" confidential
information that was produced in discovery. 343 However, there was no provision
exempting inadvertently disclosed confidential information from discovery.344

329. Id at *3.
330. Id. at *1.
331. See id.

332. Id
333. Id

334. Id.
335. Id
336. Id at *2.

337. Id. at *3.
338. Id. at *I (citing FED. R. EVID. 502(a), (b)).
339. See id. at *2.

340.
341.
342.
343.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id

344. Id
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Indeed, the order did not even mention attorney-client privilege or work
product.345
Having found that there was no 502(d) order in effect, the court then
analyzed whether the defendant could reclaim the email under 502(b). 346The
court rejected defendants' claim, finding that the defendants had failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.37 The court noted that the defendants
failed to explain what, if any, steps they took before informing the United States
that there was no claim of privilege as to any of the documents being produced
by EMS, and how defendants failed to identify the contents of the email in
In
question when preparing for the deposition of the EMS project manager.
this connection, the court pointed out that the burden rested with defendants to
show that they had taken reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and that the
universe of documents the defendants were required to review was relatively
small.349
Third, the order may fail to provide sufficient guidance as to the application
of each of the components of Rule 502(b). In US. Home Corp. v. Settlers
Crossing, LLC, 3 0 the court discussed when court orders under FRE 502(d) or
party agreements tinder 502(e) displace the standards of Rule 502. 3 One of the
defendants notified plaintiffs counsel that it intended to serve a subpoena on
plaintiffs former counsel.
Plaintiffs counsel contacted former counsel to
offer to assist in responding to the subpoena. 35 Former counsel declined the
offer, stating that they would handle the response on their own. 4 Current
counsel did nothing further about the subpoena, relying on the assurances of
former counsel because he was a partner in a nationally known firm and the
subpoena was expressly limited to nonprivileged documents. 3 On January 25,
2011, the defendant notified plaintiffs counsel that it had received former
counsel's response to the subpoena.
Six weeks later, plaintiff s counsel asked
for a cost estimate to obtain copies of the response.
About one month after
receiving copies of the response, plaintiffs counsel discovered that the response
contained material that it claimed to be privileged.

345. Id

346. Id
347. Id
348. Id (citing Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 658 (N.D. Ill. 2009)).
349. Id at *2-3.

350. No. DKC 08-1863, 2012 WL 3025111 (D. Md. July 23, 2012).
351. See id at *5.
352. Id at *1.

353. Id
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id
Id
Id at *2.
I.
Id
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After negotiated attempts to receive the contested documents failed, plaintiff
filed a motion to enforce a confidentiality order with clawback provisions.359
The provisions essentially tracked the language of FRE 502(b)(1) and FRCP
26(b)(5)(B).3 60 The district court, affirming the magistrate judge's decision,
found that Rule 502(b), rather than the confidentiality order, controlled.3 The
court gave the following test for determining when a confidential order or
agreement supplants the Rule:
To find that a court order or agreement tinder Rule 502(d) or (e)
supplants the default Rule 502(b) test, courts have required that concrete
directives be included in the court order or agreement regarding each
prong of Rule 502(b). In other words, if a court order or agreement does
not provide adequate detail regarding what constitutes inadvertence,
what precautionary measures are required, and what the producing
party's post-production responsibilities are to escape waiver, the court
will default to Rule 502(b) to fill in the gaps in controlling law.362
The court found that Rule 502 applied because "the Confidentiality Order is
silent as to either the parties' precautionary or post-production responsibilities to
avoid waiver."3 63
US. Home Corp. is significant in other respects. The plaintiff relied on
Hanson v. United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment to argue that its
counsel could not have unilaterally waived the attorney-client privilege because
the privilege belonged to the client.364 The court agreed with this proposition but
pointed out that the Hanson court said that an attorney's "unilateral
disclosure . . . tells us nothing about whether [the client] has waived its right to
withhold" the document.
Thus, while the plaintiff could not waive the
privilege because of the conduct of its former counsel, it could do so by its own
conduct, and Rule 502(b) established standards for waiver based on plaintiffs
conduct. 366
The court then found that the plaintiff failed to offer sufficient details about
the preventive measures taken by current counsel to protect ACP and WPP.367 In
particular, the plaintiff only showed two brief telephone calls by its current
counsel noting that "[s]uch minimal efforts to secure the privilege or protection

359.
360.
361.
362.

Id.
See id.
Id. at *6 (citing Grinun et al., supra note 22, at 96).
Id. at *5.

363. Id. at *6.

364. Id. (citing Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 372 F.3d 286, 294 (4th Cir. 2004)).
365. Id. (quoting Hanson, 372 F.3d at 294) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
366. Id. at *6 & n. 16 (citing Hanson, 372 F.3d at 294).
367. Id. at *8.
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are unreasonable."3 68 Notably, the court stated that the delegation of current
counsel's res onsibility to protect the privilege to former counsel was
unreasonable. 9 In addition, the court indicated that current counsel failed to
take prompt post-production efforts to correct the disclosure.370
Another example of an inadequate clawback order can be found in Sullivan
v. Stryker Corp. 1 Like in Cinergy Corp., the order in Sullivan was a protective
order, but unlike in Cinergy Corp., the order did have a specific clawback
provision dealing with ACP and WPP.m Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the order
stated:
12. Inadvertent production or other disclosure of documents subject
to work-product immunity, the attorney-client privilege or other legal
privilege that protects information from discovery shall not constitute a
waiver of the immunity. privilege, or other protection, provided that the
producing part) notifies the receiving party in writing as soon as it
confirms such inadvertent production. Copies of such inadvertently
produced privileged and/or protected document(s) shall be returned to
the producing party or destroyed immediately upon notice of privilege
and any information regarding the content of the document(s) shall be
deleted from any litigation support or other database and is forbidden
from disclosure and forbidden from use in this action or for any other
reason at all. Any party or individual having inadvertently received
privileged or protected information need not wait for notice from the
producing party before complying with the above and is expected to
comply with the requirements of this paragraph as soon as it is known or
should be known, that the document and information contained therein.
is privileged and/or protected. The parties shall have the benefit of all
limitations on waiver afforded by Federal Rules of Evidence 502. Any
inadvertent disclosure of privileged information shall not operate as a
waiver in any other federal or state proceeding, and the parties'
agreement regarding the effect of inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information shall be binding on nonparties.
13. Any party may, within ten (10) business days after notification
of the inadvertent disclosure tinder paragraph 12, object to the claim of
inadvertence by notifying the designating or producing party in writing
of that objection and specifying the designated or produced material to
which objection is made. Only in the event of such a dispute may the
receiving party(ies) sequester and retain a single copy of the claimed
protected materials for the sole purpose of seeking court determination

368.
369.
370.
371.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
No. 3:10-CV-0177 ('IAD/DEP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60887 (N.D.NY. June 6, 2011).

372. Id. at *8-10.
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of the issue. The parties shall confer within five (5) days of service of
any written objection. If the objection is not resolved, the designating
party shall, within three (3) days of the conference, file and serve a
motion to resolve the dispute. If a motion is filed, information subject to
dispute shall be treated consistently with the designating or producing
party's most recent designation until further Order of this Court.
Note that this provision does not say anything about the precautions a party
must take with regard to privileged material before production.374 Thus, a party
trying to reclaim material would need to show that it used reasonable precautions
to prevent disclosure.
Also note that the provision does not have a definition
of inadvertent. 6 However, this provision does provide time periods for action,
thus reducing the possibility of controversy over whether a party "took
reasonable steps to rectify the error" under FRE 502(b)(3).
Fourth, a clawback order may fail to deal with the problem of intentional
disclosures. Such a provision is particularly important when the order allows a
party to disclose information without any pre-production review for privilege, as
was the case in Potomac Electric discussed above.
VI.

DRAFTING CLAWBACK ORDERS

A number of lessons can be drawn from the analysis of clawback orders in
Part V.
1. The order should be labeled as a "clawback order" to distinguish it from
a general protective order.
2. The order may be based either on an agreement of the parties or a
motion for a protective order. In the latter case, the order should be based on a
showing of good cause.
3. The order should state that it is designed to protect ACP or WPP
information disclosed in discovery from waiver due to production pursuant to the
court order.
4. The order should state that its provisions supersede and replace the
provisions of FRE 502.
5. If the order will relieve a producing party of any pre-production
privilege review, it should provide that any disclosure pursuant to the order

373. Id.
374. See id
375. See id at *9 ("The parties shall have the benefit of all limitations on waiver afforded by
Federal Rules of Evidence 502."); see also FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (providing that an inadvertent
disclosure of privileged information "does not operate as a waiver" if, among other things, the
producing party used reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure).
376. See Sullivan. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60887. at *8-10.
377. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
378. See supra notes 264 73 and accompanying text.
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without pre-production review will be "inadvertent" within the meaning of the
FRE 502(b)(1).
6. If the order will impose some level of pre-production review on the
producing party, it should specify the methodology to be used.39 In this case,
the order should define "inadvertent" to be consistent with the methodology set
forth in the order.
7. If the order will only protect against inadvertent disclosure, it should
define "inadvertent" broadly to include any mistake in identification, review, or
production of ACP or WPP material.
8. The order should specify that a party who receives ACP or WPP
material produced in discovery should notify the producing party and include a
timeframe and the method of notification.
9. The order should specify that a producing part) who learns that it has
produced documents subject to ACP or WPP shall promptly notify the recipient
to comply with the obligations of FRCP 26(b)(5)(B). The order should provide
details for the timeframe and the method of notification.
10. The order should include provisions stating that production of ACP and
WPP material as a result of this order is not intentional, and that "fairness" does
not justify a subject matter waiver as to any such disclosed material because the
disclosure is not being made to obtain an unfair litigation advantage.
11. The order could include additional provisions, such as privilege log
details and cost-sharing provisions.
Appendix A contains the clawback order in Adair,sso which follows many of
the principles set forth above. Appendix B contains a more elaborate draft of a
clawback agreement, along with a draft court order approving the agreement.
Alternatively, if the parties fail to agree to the terms of the clawback agreement,
the court could amend the drafts as needed and enter them as a clawback order.

379. See, e.g., Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., Nos. 1:10CV00037, 1:10CV00041, 2012 WL
2526982, at *3-4 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012) (providing an example of an order specifying
methodology of pre-production review).
380. Id.
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APPENDIX A

Case 1:10-cy-00037-JPJ-PMS

Document 257 Filed 11/29/11

Page 625of 2 Pageid#: 2440

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ABINGDON DIVISION
ROBERT ADAIR on behalf of himself
and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

Case No. 1:10cv0037

EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY, et al.,
)

Defendants.

PROTECTIVE ORDER A-LOWING CLAWBACK RIGHI-TS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) and Fed R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1), and in order to
facilitate discovery and avoid delays, the court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1.

The disclosure or production of any information or documents that are

subject to an objection on the basis of the attorney-client privilege or the work-product
doctrine or any other privilege or immunity against discovery ("Protected Documents")
will not be deemed to waive a party's claim to their privileged or protected nature or to
estop that party from

later

designating

the

Protected

Documents

as privileged or

protected.

2.

Any party receiving Protected Documents shall return them upon request

from the producing party.

Any such request must specify the type of privilege or

immunity that the producing party is asserting with respect to each Protected Document
covered by the request.

Upon receiving such a request as to specific information or

documents, the receiving party shall return the Protected Documents to the producing
party within five (5) business days, whether or not the receiving party agrees with the
claim of privilege or protection.
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Case 1:10-cy-00037-JPJ-PMS Document 257 Filed 11/29/11

[VOL. 64: 581
Page 2of 2 Pageid#: 2441
2

3.

Prior to the return or a request for return of Protected Documents, the

receiving party shall treatsuch documents as Confidential under the Protective Order.

4.

This Order shall apply to all Protected Documents that are produced in the case,

whether or not production was inadvertent and whether or not care was taken by the producing
party to avoid disclosure.

The producing party is specifically authorized to produce

Protected Documents without a prior privilege review, and the producing party shall not be
deemed to have waived any privilege or protection in not undertaking such a review.

5.

Nothing herein shall prevent the receiving party from contesting the protected

status of Protected Documents on grounds unrelated to their production pursuant to this
Order.

ENTER: this29th day of November,2011.

/s! Pamela Meade Sargent
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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B

CLAWBACK AGREEMENT REGARDING PRIVILEGED INFORMATION
INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSED IN DISCOVERY
Agreement made and entered into this

day of

_

2013 by and between [insert here the

names of the parties to the agreement]
RECITALS:

The parties intend by this Agreement:
to cooperate to reduce the cost and delay involved in this Litigation and
to specify the exclusive circumstances under which Inadvertent disclosure of
Information subject to Attorney-Client Privilege (ACP) or Work-Product Protection
(WPP) will constitute a waiver of ACP or WPP:
to replace the standards set for in Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 502(b) with
specific standards to guide their conduct
to provide that Inadvertent production of ACP or WPP material pursuant to the
terms of this order will not be a voluntary or intentional disclosure under FRE 502(a) and
also does not result in unfairness under FRE 502(a)(3);
to enter into a stipulation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 29(b);
to move the Court for an order adopting this agreement pursuant to FRE
502(d) and (e).
Therefore, in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth below, the parties hereby agree as
follows:
1.

Scope.

This agreement applies to disclosure of information in the following federal

matters: [Insert here the matters to which this agreement applies.]
This agreement also applies to state proceedings and to federal court-annexed and federal
court-mandated arbitration proceedings in the circumstances set forth in FRE 502.
2.

Definitions.
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(a) "Attorney-Client Privilege" (ACP) means "the privilege applicable law provides for
confidential attorney-client communications." FRE 502(g)(1);
(b) "Claimant" means a Party to this agreement that is asserting a claim that it or a third person
has made an Inadvertent disclosure of Information to an Opposing Party that is subject to ACP or
WPP:
(c) "Disclosing Person" means a person responding to a discovery request in this Litigation
and includes that person's attorneys, agents, and employees,
(d) "Inadvertent disclosure" means disclosure of Information in response to a discovery
request that is subject to a claim of ACP or WPP when the Disclosing Person made a mistake in
disclosing the Information to an Opposing Party. The term "mistake" is intended to be broad, to
include without limitation oversight, accident, technical error, or error of judgment including
failure:
(i) to identify the Information as subject to ACP or WPP; or
(ii) in reviewing the Information to determine that the Information was subject to
ACP or W\'PP: or
(iii) to withhold Information that the Disclosing Person had determined was subject
to ACP or WPP.

The parties have agreed pursuant to FRE 502(e) that this is the

definition of "inadvertent" for the purpose of FRE 502(b)(1).
(e) "Information" means communications or data in any form, whether tangible or electronic;
(t) "Litigation" refers to the matters indicated in paragraph 1.
(g) "Opposing Party" means a signatory to this agreement that is adverse in this Litigation to
another party;
(h) "Party" means a signatory to this Agreement;
(i) "Pre-production review methodology" (PRM) means a methodology to determine if the
Information is subject to ACP or WPP as set forth below:
(j) "Privilege or Privileged" means subject to ACP or WPP or both;
(k) "Recipient" means a person that has received Information in discovery in connection with
this Litigation;

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/5

48

Crystal: Inadvertent Production of Priviledged Information in Discovery in
2013]

THE NEED FOR WELL-DRAFTED CLAWBACK AGREEMENTS

629

(1) "Work-Product Protection" (WPP) means "the protection that applicable law provides for
tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial." FRE

502(g)(2).
3.

Pre-production Review Methodologv. The Parties hereby agree that the PRM set forth in

Appendix A for each Party is the method for that Party to use in determining whether Information
otherwise subject to discovery is subject to a claim of Privilege.
If a Disclosing Person complies with its PRM but nonetheless produces Information that is
subject to a claim of Privilege, the disclosure shall be treated as Inadvertent under this agreement.
If a Disclosing Person discloses Information subject to Privilege as a result of a failure to
comply with its PRM, the disclosure will be treated as a waiver of Privilege, but only as to the
Information so disclosed.
A Disclosing Person who for economic or other reasons decides not to comply with its PRM
shall notify any Party to swhom production is being made of its decision not to follow its PRM.

A

Disclosing Person may decide to follow the PRM for a response to some discovery requests but not
to others.

If a Disclosing Person elects not to follow its PRM in responding to a discovery request,

a Recipient may use or disclose Information disclosed in responding to such discovery request free
of any claim by the Disclosing Person of Privilege.
The Parties have agreed pursuant to FRE 502(e) that compliance with that Party's PRM
constitutes "reasonable steps to prevent disclosure" of Privilege under FRE 502(b)(2).
4.

Privilege Log. A Party that claims that it is not required to produce Information in

discovery on the ground that the Information is subject to Privilege shall prepare a privilege log
with regard to the Information containing the following entries for each item of Information:

[Here

list the requirements for the privilege log or refer to local rule or court order for the requirements.]
5.

Obligations of Claimant to Notify Recipient of Inadvertent Disclosure of Information. If

a Claimant learns of Inadvertent disclosure of Privileged Information to a Recipient, the Claimant
shall provide the notice set forth in this paragraph to the Recipient in writing within five (5)
business days from the date the Claimant learns of the Inadvertent disclosure.
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obligation to notify the Recipient applies regardless of the way in which the Claimant learns of the
Inadvertent disclosure, including notice from the Recipient under the next paragraph.
The Claimant's notice shall identify to the extent reasonably possible the Information subject
to Privilege, state the basis for the claim of Privilege, and direct the Recipient to follow the
procedures set forth in this paragraph.
If the Recipient fails or refuses to follow the procedures set forth below, the Claimant shall
promptly file a motion with the Court under seal seeking return of the Information to which it is
asserting a claim of Privilege.

If the Claimant fails to follow the procedure set forth in this

paragraph, the Recipient may use or disclose the Information free of any claim of Privilege by the
Claimant.
The Parties have agreed pursuant to FRE 502(e) that the procedure set forth in this Paragraph
constitutes "reasonable steps to rectify the error" of inadvertent disclosure of Privileged Information

502(b)(3).
6.

Obligations When Recipient Learns of Inadvertent Disclosure of Information.

If a

Recipient learns that it has received Information that is identified as Privileged relating to a
Disclosing Person, the Recipient shall notify the Disclosing Person in writing of the receipt of such
Information within five (5) business days.
If a Claimant provides the notice to the Recipient set forth in the preceding paragraph, the
Recipient:
(i) must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified Information and any copies it has;
(ii) must not use or disclose the Information until the claim is resolved;
(iii) must take reasonable steps to retrieve the Information if the Recipient has disclosed it
before being notified;
(iv) may promptly present the Information to the Court under seal for a determination of the
claim.
The Claimant must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.
7.

Consequence of an Uncontested Challenge by Recipient or Court Decision in Favor of

Claimant. If the Recipient does not challenge or if the Court upholds the Claimant's claim of
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Privilege as to Information in the Recipient's possession, the Recipient or its counsel shall return or
dispose of the specified communication or information, as well as any hard or electronic copies
thereof within ten (10) business days. Within five (5) business days of taking such measures, the
Recipient party shall certify in writing that it has complied with the requirements of this paragraph.
8.

Production under this Agreement as U nintentional. The parties agree that production of

Information that is subject to Privilege under this Agreement is inadvertent rather than voluntary or
intentional and accordingly is not grounds for a claim of subject matter waiver under FRE 502(a).
The parties further agree that disclosure of Information subject to Privilege was done inadvertently
without tactical intent, and accordingly does not result in unfairness under FRE 502(a)(3).
9.

Costs. The Claimant shall reimburse the Recipient for any reasonable costs incurred by

the Recipient in connection with identification, deletion, and return of Information that was
Inadvertently disclosed under this agreement, including the cost of staff time incurred by the
Recipient to identify the location of such Information and to delete it from devices and applications
where it may be located.
Agreed to this

day of

22013

502(d) Order
This Order is issued pursuant to Rule 502(d) and (e) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
and pursuant to Rules 16(b)(3). 26(b)(1), 26(b)(2), and 26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP).
The Court approves the attached "Clawback Agreement Regarding Information Inadvertently
Disclosed in Discovery Subject to Attorney-Client Privilege or Work Product Protection."

In

particular, pursuant to FRE 502(d) and (e) the Court approves the definition of inadvertent. and the
procedures for pre-production and post-production review as set forth in the Agreement to replace
the standards set forth in FRE 502.

As set forth in the Agreement, the Agreement constitutes a

stipulation of the parties pursuant to Rule 29(b) of FRCP.
So ORDERED this

day of

,2013.

United States Magistrate Judge
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